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Abstract  
 
The present thesis deals with the US strategic approach and posture to 
cybersecurity from a national point of view. On such a topic much has been 
written already, nonetheless the present work finds a degree of originality 
by tackling such object of analysis shifting the focus to a ideational 
perspective. By drawing insights from the meta-theory of Constructivism 
and the rich research tradition on strategic culture, the present thesis aims 
at understanding what kind of norms seem to be informing/mirroring what 
has been labelled the US “cyber strategic culture”, and if it is possible to 
speak of a “shift”, or at least track an evolution regarding them, in a 
historical timeframe that runs from the early 2000s up to the present days. 
To pursue the stated research agenda, a methodology grounded in discourse 
and thematic analysis is utilised, with an analytical framework centred 
around two opposite “thematic normative categories” (themes) called 
“defensiveness” and “offensiveness”, each characterised by a “story” made 
up by three sub-themes, delineating specific strategic behaviours. A set of 
official strategies, all tackling cybersecurity and published during the 
mentioned timeframe by both the White House and the military, form the 
primary sources to which such methodology is applied, with particular 
focus being posed to the defensive paradigm known as “active cyber 
defence” measures, the 2015 Department of Defense’s Cyber Strategy, and 
the 2017 National Security Strategy. Overall, it is argued that, despite a 
predominant presence of the theme of “defensiveness”, it is indeed possible 
to speak of an on-going evolution, especially since 2011, which sees the 
norm of “offensiveness” increasingly informing the US “cyber strategic 
culture”. 
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The central object of analysis of the present dissertation is the United 
States’ (US) approach to cybersecurity, the practice of securing so-called 
cyberspace, the virtual global domain, or network, societies are growingly 
becoming dependent of. The “cyber revolution”, next to all the positive 
effects, also brought various negative ones, since it opened the door to a 
rather vast and new universe of threats and risks. With societies growing 
increasingly dependent on such a digital medium, achieving security from 
the menaces spawning within it has become a rather central topic and goal 
within the political and decision-making circles of many countries around 
the world. Accordingly, the practice of cybersecurity has achieved a rather 
high spot on the security agenda of many nation states. This sparked the 
publication of various official documents that either are partially or entirely 
dedicated to such practice and security need. Indeed, sections dedicated to 
the security of the cyber medium, and related infrastructure and 
information stored within it, are finding a place in official documents 
published by various governmental organisations.1 In addition to that, the 
cyber medium has become yet another arena where international actors 
project their interests and power, replicating those inter-state behaviours 
that since quite recently were confined to more common domains. Yet 
again, also discussion on the posture and potential behaviour to maintain 
                                                 
1 Agnija Tumkevič, “Cybersecurity in Central Eastern Europe: From Identifying 
Risks to Countering Threats”, Baltic Journal of Political Science, No. 5 (December, 
2016), 73 - 88, 73. 
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and signal to other states are now finding broader spaces within the 
mentioned official texts. Precisely the importance given to securing the 
cyber medium and states projecting their social behaviours onto it is what 
has been driving a change regarding the kind of research undertaken on it. 
Whether initially studies regarding cybersecurity and the cyber medium 
were somewhat confined within experts of computer science and 
engineering, not too long ago new research agendas have been set up and 
pursued, among others, by scholars of sociology, philosophy, and especially 
of international relations (IR) and security studies. Given the centrality the 
cyber medium has reached regarding the security of states and their mutual 
relationships, analysing their approaches to it is key to understand future 
possible scenarios on the evolution and exploitation of the medium itself, as 
well as on states’ strategic behaviours. Given the highly volatile nature of 
cyberspace, being a man-made domain, and a perceived shared idea of 
policy-making and research always lagging behind a rapid and constant 
evolution not only of the medium, but also of the threats and risks arising 
from it, keep on pursuing research agendas centred around such issues is 
crucial. 
 
The present thesis finds a place in, and builds a bridge with, the research 
agendas pursued by scholars of security studies. Despite already a rather 
vast body of knowledge has been created on the US strategic approach to 
cyber-related matters and affairs, the present thesis seeks to humbly further 
push such knowledge forward. Starting from a cautious and non-critical 
Constructivist point of view, utilising some tenets from the tradition of 
strategic culture studies, the present thesis seeks to analyse such actor’s 
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approach from a more ideational and interpretative perspective. By 
focusing the “militarization” historical moment of the “cyber era”, attention 
is posed to the norms that seem to be informing/mirroring the policies and 
signalled behaviour. To do so, the analysis of discourse, coupled with that 
of themes is utilised as the main methodology, in building a particular 
analytical framework through which the gathered primary sources are 
analysed. In addition, many insights are also drawn from a rich pool of 
gathered and scrutinised secondary sources. Overall, the intention is to 
assess whether the US seems to be informed more by a defensive or 
offensive normative background. In doing so, drawing many insights from 
various literary entries, the present thesis seeks to understand whether it is 
possible to speak of a shift, or at least track an evolution of the US “cyber 
strategic culture”, a concept coined in the present thesis. Among the not 
too vast pool of primary sources gathered, great emphasis is given to some 
specific empirical data, precisely the discourse and nature linked to the 
defensive paradigm known as “active cyber defence” (ACD) measures, the 
2015 Department of Defense’s (DOD) Cyber Strategy, and the latest 
National Security Strategy (NSS), published in late 2017. 
 
Precisely the focus given to ACD is what makes the present work stand out 
within the literature. Indeed, an on-going debate exists among 
cybersecurity experts, policy-makers, lawyers, and diplomats from various 
countries, regarding the strategic and legal applicability of such defensive 
paradigm, as well as its conceptualisation. Given that supporters attribute to 
ACD a high strategic value, but sceptics point out various legal gaps in its 
applicability, as well as arguing against such added value, the debate is long 
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from seeing an end, something that makes the study and analysis of ACD 
rather topical and of extreme interests. 
 
Regarding its structure, the present dissertation follows a rather standard 
research path. Initially, a review of pertinent literary entries is presented, 
with also the historical context the thesis takes as point of analysis briefly 
explained. Secondly, overviews of both the meta-theoretical approach and 
research tradition the dissertation draws insights from, namely 
Constructivism and strategic culture, are presented. Thirdly, a discussion 
on the nature of the sources utilised and role both discourse and thematic 
analyses play within the thesis follows. Fourthly, having built such a rich 
literary, theoretical, and methodological background, the analytical 
framework through which the gathered primary sources are analysed is 
presented. In other words, the two normative “themes" that guide the 
analysis are described and their “stories” explained. Then finally, the actual 
analysis is carried out, focusing first on one theme and then on the other, 
and especially on the above-mentioned empirical proofs. Indeed, central to 
the overall thesis’ argument is the interpretation and thorough analysis 
carried out regarding the concept and conceptualisation of ACD both at a 
broader level and within the US, as well as the discourse and “themes” 
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2. Literature review and historical context of the thesis 
 
As stated in the introductory chapter, the present dissertation aims at 
analysing the US “cyber strategic culture” by focusing on the discourse 
found in some specific official documents. Before moving onto the 
theoretical background and methodology the present dissertation is 
grounded on, or at least from which its draws some insights and 
inspiration, it is crucial to understand what the literature has already 
studied and argued on issues of interest to the present thesis.  
It goes without saying that the literature on cybersecurity, cyber defence, 
cyber war etc. is a rather vast one, with writings being published by 
scholars of various backgrounds. Started as a rather exclusive field for 
experts of computer science and engineering, with the expansion of the 
Internet and cyber medium, its exploitation by militaries and non-state 
actors, and the increased reliance of contemporary societies on it, such field 
of study became of extreme interest also for scholars of social sciences, and 
especially of IR, security, and strategic studies. Despite the present thesis 
deriving valuable insights and knowledge from both such “strands”, 
technical and social, in the present chapter only some specific entries from 
the second one are presented, since the thesis itself finds a place in it. 
Initially, focus is posed on works focused on the study of the “cyber 
discourse”; secondly, the historical context the present thesis takes into 
account is presented; thirdly, some writings taking as primary sources the 
same ones as the present dissertation are analysed; and finally, light is shed 
on the thesis’ originality and “gap” it seeks to fill. 
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2.1. Discourse analyses in regards of cyberspace and cyber-related threats 
and risks 
 
Despite an argument having been made some time ago regarding the lack of 
a political science literature on cybersecurity rooted in theories of IR,2 
during the last decade many scholars coming from such field of research, as 
well as from security and strategic studies, started closing such gap, with an 
increasing number of books and articles, applying some specific theories 
derived from such scholarships, being published in various important 
academic journals. One key body of literature is rooted in a methodology 
centred around the study of the discourse adopted within the broader 
cybersecurity and related sub-topics, cyberwar, cyberterrorism, and 
cybercrime. Nowadays, there is indeed a vast literature that deals with the 
discourse and the power it has in creating specific realities and threats, as 
well as in highlighting remedies to them. 
Many scholars informed by the theoretical traditions of constructivism, 
“securitization theory”, and post-structuralism have analysed the discourse 
of political actors and media, underlying a wide adoption of specific 
analogies, words, metaphors, and expressions to frame the various cyber-
related actors, threats and risks; also arguing that it has been delivered to 
create the link between the cyber-dimension and national security. 
Overall, from a rather critical perspective, the literature has demonstrated 
                                                 
2 Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello, Eds., International Relations and 
Security in the Digital Age (London: Routledge, 2007), 3; Myriam Cavelty Dunn, 
“From Cyber-Bombs to Political Fallout: Threat Representations with an Impact in 
the Cyber-Security Discourse”, International Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 
(2013), 105 - 122, 106.  
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the existence of a tendency to over-inflate threats, which are often placed 
under the umbrella of cyberwar; a move then used to justify the adoption 
of specific measures and policies rather than others. 3  In the following 
paragraphs focus is posed exclusively on a rather little sample of such a vast 
literature, precisely on works that somewhat adopt a discourse analysis as 
their methodology, which is of interest for the present dissertation. Despite 
their great academic value, various publications dealing exclusively with 
cybercrime and cyberterrorism have not been taken in account.  
 
A rather prominent voice is that of Cavelty Dunn whose works focus both 
on a broader cybersecurity discourse, as well as on the evolution and 
peculiarities on that found within the US. 
One of her most important publication is Cyber-Security and Threat 
Politics: US efforts to secure the information age, which despite being 
                                                 
3 Ralf Bendrath, “The Cyberwar Debate: Perception and Politics in U.S. Critical 
Infrastructure Protection”, in The Internet and the Changing Face of International 
Relations and Security, edited by Andreas Wenger, Information & Security: An 
International Journal, Vol. 7 (2001), 80 - 103; Ralf Bendrath, “The American 
Cyber-Angst and the Real World—Any Link?”, in Bombs and Bandwidth: The 
Emerging Relationship between Information Technology and Security, edited by 
Robert Latham (New York: Free Press, 2003), 49 - 73; Myriam Dunn Cavelty, 
Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: USA Efforts to Secure the Information Age 
(New York: Routledge, 2007); Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum, “Digital 
Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,” International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2009), 1155 - 1175; Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins, 
“Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity 
Policy”, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2011), 39 - 84; Sean 
Lawson, “Beyond Cyber-Doom: Assessing the Limits of Hypothetical Scenarios in 
the Framing of Cyber-Threats”, Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 
Vol. 10, No. 1 (2013), 86 - 103; Tim Stevens, “Apocalyptic Visions: Cyber War and 
the Politics of Time”, SSRN (April 25, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2256370.  
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somewhat old now, being initially released in 2007, offers great historical 
and analytical insights on the evolution of the debate regarding 
cybersecurity between the mid-1980s and the early years of the 2000s that 
took place within the US. Adopting a “semi-constructivist stance” grounded 
within the Copenhagen school’s "securitization theory”, Cavelty Dunn 
utilises a methodology centred on the study of discourse, as in threat 
frames. According to her, “[t]hreat framing refers to the process whereby 
particular agents develop specific interpretive schemas about what should 
be regarded as a threat or risk, how to respond to this threat, and who is 
responsible for it”.4 Her book is mainly devoted to the analysis of how 
particular understanding of the reality open up the door to particular 
behaviour, or in other words how through them social action is 
influenced. 5  More in detail, Cavelty Dunn clarifies that three type of 
framing exist: the first one is called “diagnostic framing”, which is linked to 
the designation of what or who is threatening and of the referent object 
perceived as being threatened; the second one is known as “prognostic 
framing”, being characterised by the offered solutions to the perceived 
threats and by those strategies, tactics, and objectives said useful to achieve 
them; and finally, the third one called “motivational framing” is all about 
gathering consent for the stated/decided cause/action.6  
In her analysis, Cavelty Dunn uncovers that one particular threat frame 
regarding computers and networks, which maintained a degree of 
                                                 
4 Dunn Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics, 8. 
5 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “Cyber-Terror - Looming Threat or Phantom Menace?: 
The Framing of the US Cyber-Threat Debate", Journal of Information Technology 
& Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2008), 19 - 36, 23. 
6 Ibid. 
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contemporaneity, solidified during the Clinton administration in the 
second half the 1990s. Such a frame is characterised by a focus on a rather 
vague notion of critical infrastructures, understood as the referent object of 
security that must be secured from rather vaguely defined internal and 
external threats.7  
One of the most important take aways from such an analysis is the fact that, 
despite the “cyber-discourse” being characterised by a national 
connotation, until the early 2000s the role of the military in defending the 
US was rather limited. A conclusion in line with the work of Bendrath 
who, analysing the debate on cyber risks that developed in the US during 
the 1990s, speaks of a “failed securitisation”.8 This is crucial, since with the 
new millennium this started changing, as better explained later on. 
Further, the book already points out the usage of so-called cyber doom 
scenarios by certain US state officials, a topic further reprised by other 
scholars interested in the US “cyber discourse”. Finally, of interest for the 
present thesis, is the fact that, already before the time-frame taken under 
scrutiny in it, critical infrastructures were (despite vaguely) defined as key 
referent object, a characteristic that persisted through time, as further 
pointed out by the literature and in the present dissertation. 
 
In more recent work, Cavelty Dunn clarifies further that since the 1990s 
the “cyber discourse” found within the US has been characterised by the 
presence of three interrelated and mutual reinforcing different 
                                                 
7 Dunn Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics, 132. 
8 Bendrath, “The Cyberwar Debate: Perception and Politics in U.S. Critical 
Infrastructure Protection”. 
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“alternatives”. These are respectively called “technical”, “crime-espionage”, 
and “military/civil defence”, all characterised by specific malicious actors, 
threats, and “referent objects”. For instance, while the first one is more of a 
technical nature, concerned mostly with malicious software and system 
intrusion, and the second one more focused on so-called cyber crime and 
cyber espionage, the third one appears to be more “discourse driven” and 
linked to a national security level, adopted initially by the military and 
focused on matters linked to war, as well as on (the already mentioned) 
protection of (digital) critical infrastructure(s).9 
In her publications posthumous to Cyber-Security and Threat Politics, 
Cavelty Dunn still adopts a rather critical stance, further arguing how 
“particular ways of framing threats or risks are not only a matter of choice 
[…] but also come with political and social effect”.10 Indeed, she contends 
that the mentioned three US “cyber discourses”, until the first half of the 
first decade of the 21st century, produced a rather well-balanced set of 
policies, with the military still not having a predominant role in defending 
the “homeland” and its critical infrastructures. Such a situation started to 
change as soon as more emphasis was given to the third discourse, the 
“military and civil defence” one, which started gaining more traction on 
the wave of a shift in the overall threat perception concerning cyber-risk 
                                                 
9 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “The Militarisation of Cyberspace: Why Less May Be 
Better”, in 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, edited by C. 
Czosseck, R. Ottis, and K. Ziolkowski (Talinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE 
Publications, 2012), 141 - 153, 142; Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “Like a phoenix from 
the ashes: The reinvention of critical infrastructure protection as distributed 
security”, in Securing 'the Homeland': Critical Infrastructure, Risk and (In) 
Security, edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Kristian Søby Kristensen 
(Routledge, 1st edition June 18, 2008), 40 - 62. 
10 Dunn Cavelty, “The Militarisation of Cyberspace”, 142. 
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and vulnerabilities, characterised by the perception of the US being 
constantly and increasingly “under fire”.11  
Other scholars approached the evolution regarding the practices and 
measures adopted in pursuit of enhancing national cybersecurity, adopting 
a methodology and theoretical background similar to those employed by 
Cavelty Dunn, thus posing attention to the discourse and threat-framing 
practices to justify specific political decisions. For example, Lawson, writing 
from a critical constructivist theoretical point of view, focuses attention to 
some cyber-doom scenarios utilised within the US “cyber-discourse”, such 
as “cyber-9/11” and “cyber-Katrina”. By placing them within the context of 
the history of technology, military history, and the sociology of disaster, 
Lawson argues that the story and narrative contained in such “end-of-the-
world-visions” are linked to longstanding fears of technology pessimism 
and technology failure, which are not really realistic. 12  Further, he 
contends that “[i]n cyber-doom scenarios, cybersecurity is framed primarily 
in terms of “war” and,[…] large-scale “disaster”[, which] can lead to a 
militarist, command-and-control mindset that is ultimately 
counterproductive”. 13  Lawson’s analysis does find a link with that of 
Cavelty Dunn since it also adopts threat framing, highlighting how cyber-
doom scenarios have the potential to concretise some negative political 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Of a similar note is Lewis who stresses how scenarios and coincidences utilised 
when crafting a linkage between cyberattacks and WMD effects are simply not 
credible. James A. Lewis, Conflict and Negotiation in Cyberspace (Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, February, 2013), 58. 
13 Lawson, “Beyond Cyber-Doom”, 95. 
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choices when utilised as motivational frames, sometimes even replacing 
more properly formulated diagnostic frames.14  
Similarly, Brito and Watkins focus on some threat inflation practices 
carried out by exponents of the US federal government, military, and 
media. Despite not specifying any theoretical background similar to those 
employed by Cavelty Dunn or Lawson, the analysis conducted by them 
finds a link with the ones above-mentioned, since it focuses on the 
potential the adoption of a certain discourse has in justifying specific 
policies said to be misguided. To develop their argument such two scholars 
pose attention to various official documents published by federal bodies, a 
think thank, and singular political figures between 2009 and 2010. What 
they uncover is the already mentioned trend to over-inflate threats coming 
from cyberspace, calling for more involvement of the federal government 
and increased spending; a rhetoric then simply picked up and re-proposed 
by some well-known media outlets.15 Overall, it could be said that their 
analysis does find a link with the theory of “securitization” since attention 
is posed to “speech acts” made by figures occupying places of power that 
can be understood as ”securitizing actors”, 16  as well as with an article 
written by Cavelty Dunn proposing an analysis of the broader “cyber 
discourse”, taking into account not only “elite personalities”, but also other 
non-governmental actors who are said to “play a substantial part in 
constructing discursive settings”.17 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 99. 
15 Brito and Watkins, “Loving the Cyber Bomb?”. 
16 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009), 214. 
17 Dunn Cavelty, "From Cyber-Bombs to Political Fallout”, 118. 
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These cited works are important not only because they give an overview on 
the kind of theories and methodologies adopted when analysing the “cyber 
discourse" within the US, but also because they introduce the time-frame 




2.2. The historical moment taken into account - “Militarization” 
 
The process of militarisation indicates a “growing pressures on 
governments and their armed forces to develop the capacity to fight and 
win wars in [a particular] domain”.18 Many agree on the fact that the US, as 
well as many other states, is currently going through it regarding 
cyberspace and cybersecurity. 
For instance, Haizler opens his article “The United States’ Cyber Warfare 
History” by clearly dividing the history of US cyber warfare into three 
different moments, respectively labelled “Realization”, “Takeoff”, and 
“Militarization”,19 each characterised by the adoption of different doctrines 
and the kind of threats and adversaries faced. Whether the first two time 
frames, “Realization” and “Takeoff”, encompass the 1980s, 1990s, and early 
years of the 2000s, it is the “Militarization” one that of most importance for 
                                                 
18 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Ronald Deibert: Tracking the emerging arms 
race in cyberspace”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 1 (2011), 1 - 8, 
2. 
19 A similar distinction is made also by Healey. Jason Healey and Karl Grindal, 
Eds., A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Cyber Conflict 
Studies Association, 2013). 
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the present dissertation. Such phase is indeed said to begin around 
2003/2004, with the semi-official conceptualisation of the cyber medium as 
a “new theatre of operations”,20 and still on-going. Rather than diving into 
explanations of the driving forces of such a process, Haizler offers a detailed 
description on the characteristic of the US approach to cybersecurity, 
highlighting governmental bodies in charge of it, focusing especially on the 
role of the Intelligence Community (IC) and that of the Department of 
Defense (DOD).21 Overall, Haizler’s article clearly demonstrates that the 
present thesis, given the fact that it focuses on a historical timeframe that 
begins with the early 2000s and goes all the way to the present days, is fully 
linked to the on-going process of militarisation. Accordingly, the argument 
of the present writing needs to be read having in mind the characteristics 
of such historical moment, which are briefly highlighted in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
Regarding the causes that sparked and further alimented the militarisation 
process especially in the US some scholars adopting more traditional 
materialistic and rationalist IR theories, underline the strategic advantages 
that the cyber domain offers relative to “land, air, and sea [and especially] 
its asymmetric nature, plausible deniability, and [most of all] offensive 
                                                 
20 Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello, "The Information Revolution, 
Security, and International Relations: (IR) Relevant Theory?”, International 
Political Science Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 (July, 2006), 221 - 244, 231; David 
Barnard-Wills and Debi Ashenden, “Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber 
Terror, and Risk”, Space and Culture, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2012), 110 - 123, 114. 
21 Omry Haizler, “The United States’ Cyber Warfare History: Implications on 
Modern Cyber Operational Structures and Policymaking”, Cyber, Intelligence, 
and Security, Vol. 1, No.1 (January, 2017), 31 - 45. 
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advantage”;22 arguably, all factors grasped within the US federal bodies, as 
showed later on. 
As already mentioned, those scholars who focus on the analysis of the 
discourse and threat framing processes, argue that precisely a shift in such a 
framing and related discourses formed the basis onto which US political 
and military elite justified the increased involvement of the federal 
government and military within national cybersecurity protection, which 
since the early 2000s had fallen mainly within the hands of the private 
sector, with the role of the government and especially military limited to 
the protection of their own digital assets.23 More precisely, it has been 
argued that the rising dependence of societies on Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) “introduces an existential threat that 
[could] be exploited [also] by states […] thus requir[ing] cyberspace to be 
secured”.24 Cavelty Dunn indeed explains that states now are driven by a 
willingness to apply a more traditional conception of border to 
cyberspace,25 being thus able to define a space that needs to be secured 
from a variety of threats, which need to be kept out. 26  Accordingly, 
cybersecurity is paralleled to traditional types of threat faced by societies, 
                                                 
22 Miguel Alberto N. Gomez, “Arming Cyberspace: The Militarization of a Virtual 
Domain”, Global Security and Intelligence Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring, 2016), 42 
- 65, 43; Amit Sharma, “Cyber Wars: A Paradigm Shift from Means to Ends”, 
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2010), 62 - 73; Adam P. Liff, “Cyberwar: A New 
‘Absolute Weapon’? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate 
War”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2012), 401 - 428. 
23 Dunn Cavelty, “The Militarisation of Cyberspace”, 145. 
24 Gomez, “Arming Cyberspace”, 43. 
25 Such a concept is a rather ambiguous one within cyberspace, as later on briefly 
explained. 
26 Such a point is further reprised in the thesis. 
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calling for an active involvement of the military through a discourse 
characterised by terms such as “defence” and “deterrence”.27 Regarding the 
US, the logic of deterrence has also been fully applied to cyberspace, with 
politicians and military officials, despite scepticism being raised by 
academics, thinking in such terms also regarding cybersecurity and cyber 
threats.28 
Further, Cavelty Dunn also clarifies that five developments participated in 
speeding up the militarisation process, which are respectively linked to: the 
nature of so-called malware (a term better explained later on); the rivalry 
between the US and China; the activity of “hacktivists”; the (already stated) 
widely adoption of the term cyberwar when speaking of cyber-related 
incidents and attacks; and the 2010 discovery of Stuxnet.29 
 
Whether during the two previous “cyber-eras” few international actors 
possessed truly advanced cyber capabilities, nowadays many more states, 
both major and minor within the international arena, do have them. 
                                                 
27 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “Breaking the Cyber-Security Dilemma: Aligning 
Security Needs and Removing Vulnerabilities”, Science and Engineering Ethics, 
Vol. 20, No. 3 (September, 2014), 701 - 715, 708. 
28 Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace”, International 
Security, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Winter, 2016/2017), 44 - 71, 65. 
29 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “The militarisation of cyber security as a source of global 
tension”, in Strategic Trends 2012: Key Developments in Global Affairs, edited by 
Daniel Möckli (Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich, 2012), 103 - 124, 107 - 
112. Arguably, also other cyber-related events and incidents that happened during 
the last decade had a similar effect to the ones Stuxnet had, such as the campaign 
of cyberattacks unleashed allegedly by Russia against Estonia’s systems, as well as 
a similar one that happened during the conflict between Georgia and Russia the 
year after, in 2008. For a rather complete overview on such two events and on 
Stuxnet (on which a vast literature exists) see: Healey and Grindal, A Fierce 
Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012. 
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Secondly, as already hinted, China has been singled out as cyber-enemy 
no.1 by the US, with Russia, Iran, and North Korea coming right after on 
the list. Thirdly, cyber attacks and the means employed allegedly became 
more complex, targeted, and persistent. 30  Fourthly, the world saw the 
manifestation of some "cyber events", which had various effects  (both 
political and organisational) at the global level. Precisely Stuxnet, a 
malicious software unleashed by the US and Israel against an Iranian 
facility devoted to the enrichment of the uranium, has been singled out as a 
game changer, said to have established a new norm of conduct in cyber 
affairs.31 Stuxnet, as previously briefly introduced, was a wake-up call, with 
states not only realising the potential the cyber medium holds in enhancing 
their hard power capabilities, but also better visualising the threats and 
risks societies and militaries face. Overall, states started focusing more on 
offensive capabilities, sparking an arms race and fostering a “(cyber) 
security-dilemma”; they increased their spending in cybersecurity and 
                                                 
30 Within the literature great emphasis has been given to so-called “Advanced 
Persistent Threats (APTs). They are described as being “stealthy, targeted, and 
data focused”; proper cyber campaigns designed to achieve an undetected presence 
within targeted networks and computers for as long as possible, deployed to steal 
information often deemed of such sensible nature to be linked to national security 
itself. Overall, APTs were indeed initially conceived by the US DOD to describe 
Chinese cyber-espionage efforts against US national security interests. Eric Cole, 
Advanced Persistent Threat: Understanding the Danger and How to Protect Your 
Organization (Syngress, 2012); Ivo Friedberg, Florian Skopik, Giuseppe Settanni, 
and Roman Fiedler, “Combating advanced persistent threats: From network event 
correlation to incident detection”, Computers & Security, Vol. 48 (February, 
2015), 35 - 57; Ronald Mendell, “Advanced persistent threat” (APT), 
Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., December 10, 2015 (accessed March 2018), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/advanced-persistent-threat. 
31 James P. Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, “The New Reality of Cyber War”, 
Survival, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2012), 107 - 120. 
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cyber capabilities, feeding an ever increasing “cyber industrial complex”, 
and they started setting up so-called cyber commands.32 Regarding the US, 
such a kind of organisation is the so-called CYBERCOM (acronym for 
Cyber Command, indeed). More in detail, CYBERCOM is one of DOD’s ten 
unified commands, which brings together all those US military components 
somewhat linked to cyber issues. CYBERCOM was created in 2009 as a 
sub-unified command within the broader US Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM), and placed next to the US National Security Agency (NSA) 
at Fort George G. Meade, in Maryland.33 Recently, CYBERCOM’s status 
was elevated to full independent unified combatant command, no longer 
directly linked to the NSA itself.34 Overall, scholars have pointed out that a 
tendency to go offensive in cyberspace is reflected in such new 
organisation, since its mission not only involves defensive operations, but 
also requires it to be prepared to, “when directed, conduct full-spectrum 
military cyberspace operations”.35  
 
                                                 
32 Dunn Cavelty, “The Militarisation of Cyberspace” 
33 Steve Winterfeld and Jason Andress, The Basics of Cyber Warfare: 
Understanding the Fundamentals of Cyber Warfare in Theory and Practice 
(Syngress, 2013), 34; P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and 
Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know® (Oxford University Press, 1st edition, 
January 3, 2014), 133 - 138. 
34 Katie Lange, “Cybercom Becomes DoD’s 10th Unified Combatant Command”, 
DoDLive, May 3, 2018 (accessed June 2018), 
http://www.dodlive.mil/2018/05/03/cybercom-to-become-dods-10th-unified-
combatant-command/.  
35 Peter Beaumont, “US appoints first cyber warfare general”, The Guardian, May 
23, 2010 (accessed May 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/23/us-appoints-cyber-warfare-
general; Ilai Saltzman, “Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense Balance", 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2013), 40 - 63, 48. 
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As already introduced, currently there is a widely shared belief that offence 
trumps defence in cyberspace. Despite such a belief being present since the 
1980s, scholars from IR, security and strategic studies, have systematically 
been writing on it since only quite recently, again often adopting more 
materialist and rationalist IR theories, such as the “offence-defence balance 
theory”. In brief, Kello clarifies that given the nature of the domain, the 
attackers are able to exploit defenders’ vulnerabilities, achieving a high 
degree of unpredictability and undetectability, being also able to 
concentrate their resources in specific chosen procedures of entry, with the 
defenders needing, on the contrary, to constantly “protect the entire [and 
constantly growing] network surface against the vast universe of 
conceivable attacks”.36 Of importance for the thesis is the fact that such way 
of thinking regarding cyberspace has been said to be especially found in US 
military and political circles. Examples often cited within the literature are 
statements pronounced by military officials, such as former Deputy 
Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III.37 Not surprisingly, despite the 
high levels of secrecy, many scholars contend that the US is indeed “the 
most offensively capable state in cyberspace”.38 
 
                                                 
36 Lucas Kello, “The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and 
Statecraft”, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, (Fall, 2013), 7 - 40, 27 - 28. 
37 Cited in Rebecca Slayton, “What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance?: 
Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment”, International Security, Vol. 41, No. 3, 
(Winter, 2016/2017), 72 - 109, 72. 
38 Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: 
Cyber Conflict in the International System (Oxford University Press, 2015), 93; 
Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness, “The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict 
Between Rival Antagonists, 2001–2011”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 51, No. 3 
(2014), 347 - 360. 
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Here, a clarification is in order: despite the term “militarization" is adopted 
for the period beginning with 2003, with scholars often pointing out 
Stuxnet as the event that sparked interest in the offensive use of the cyber 
medium, the US military demonstrated a strategic and tactical interest for it 
at least since the second half of the 20th century, and especially since the 
1980s and 1990s. Indeed, during the last 20 years of the last century, within 
US military circles, many started speaking of a ICT Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA).39 A technology that was said of being capable of multiplying 
one’s own force against adversaries.40 Strategists started publishing various 
manuals on such a RMA, which were put to the test during the 1991 Gulf 
War (within the context of Operation Desert Shield) as well as during the 
1999 Kosovo War. 41  Therefore, the US military saw the turn of the 
millennium having already experience in the offensive use of the cyber 
medium, as well as a doctrine in place for such operations. 
 
Overall, Stuxnet is often taken as the key empirical proof that the US went 
full offensive regarding its cyberspace capabilities, since such a malicious 
software was clearly developed with a specific political goal in mind, that of 
stopping (or at least slow down) Iran’s uranium-enrichment program, 
                                                 
39 A Revolution in Military Affairs is a rather debated concept within the 
literature; in simple terms it can be understood as a rather dramatic change in the 
character and conduct of conflict due to the invention and adoption of new 
technologies. Some historical examples are the “gunpowder revolution” and 
“nuclear revolution”. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to computer; the pattern 
of military revolutions”, The National Interest, Vol. 37 (Fall, 1994), 30+. 
40 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Ronald Deibert”, 3. 
41 Dunn Cavelty, “The Militarisation of Cyberspace: Why Less May Be Better”, 
144. 
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which provided it “with a latent nuclear-weapons potential”.42 Recently, 
scholars found yet another empirical proof of a focus on offensive cyber 
capabilities in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
so-called “Plan X”, which, by building a user-friendly visualisation of 
cyberspace, is said to make it easier to conduct aggressive cyber 
operations.43 In addition, activists long have been pointing out the fact that 
the US allegedly more often than not decides not to disclose so-called zero-
days vulnerabilities,44 keeping them for itself in order to achieve a strategic 
advantage over its adversaries, both in defence and offence. 45  Finally, 
despite such empirical proofs, it must be pointed out that a brilliant study 
conducted by Valeriano and Maness showed that the US vis-à-vis China 
malicious cyber activity constantly showed self-restraint, avoiding 
aggressive hard power responses, and preferring more traditional 
diplomatic ones.46 Indeed, no such thing as a Stuxnet 2.0 materialised yet, 
                                                 
42 Ivanka Barzashka, “Are Cyber-Weapons Effective?”, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 158, 
No. 2 (2013), 48 - 56, 48. 
43 Noah Shachtman, “Darpa Looks to Make Cyberwar Routine with Secret ‘Plan 
X’”, Wired, August 21, 2012 (accessed June 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/2012/08/plan-x/; Noah Shachtman, “‘Degrade, Disrupt, 
Deceive’: U.S. Talks Openly About Hacking Foes”, Wired, August 28, 2012 
(accessed June 2018), https://www.wired.com/2012/08/degrade-disrupt-deceive/. 
44 Such a term refers to those vulnerabilities (within software and hardware) that 
have not been widely acknowledged by security service providers. They are truly 
valuable to attackers, which can exploit them to carry out attacks that can not 
initially be detected. Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 299. 
45 Tim Stevens, “Cyberweapons: Power and the Governance of the Invisible” 
(Forthcoming); Nicholas Weaver, “Is the NSA Doing More Harm Than Good in 
Not Disclosing Exploits?”, Foreign Policy, September 25, 2017 (accessed June 
2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/25/is-the-nsa-doing-more-harm-than-
good-in-not-disclosing-exploits-zero-days/.  
46 Valeriano and Maness, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities. 
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with the current “militarization” historical phase being one of cyber-
skirmishes,47 rather than devastating “cyber wars”. 
 
2.3. Analyses of official documents also utilised in the present thesis 
 
Finally, important is to clarify how the literature has approached some of 
the official documents the present thesis also takes into account, which 
have been published since the early 2000s, therefore during the George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama presidencies. Overall, such documents have been 
analysed adopting specific theoretical lenses, or in a more straightforward 
fashion, putting them in relation with previous ones, but without venturing 
in IR and security studies theories. 
Stevens carries out an analysis of some specific key official texts published 
under the Presidency of Barack Obama to demonstrate that there has been 
a shift towards a normative approach to cybersecurity and deterrence in 
cyberspace. In his brilliant and complex piece, Stevens looks at deterrence 
and at the constructivist understanding of norms, fusing the two to arrive 
at a paradigm that sees a degree of deterrence achieved through regulative 
norms, which are said to enhance the predictability of international actors. 
Precisely this is what seems to be driving the 2011 International Strategy 
for Cyberspace, namely a tendency to push for the agreement of regulative 
norms for cyberspace in following the role of a norm entrepreneur, which 
underlines the importance of cooperation and voluntary action. Of course, 
                                                 
47 David J. Betz and Tim Stevens, Cyberspace and the State: Toward a strategy for 
cyber-power (Adelphi series Book 424; The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies - IISS; Routledge; 1st edition, January 28, 2012) [Kindle Edition], Kindle 
Location 2363. 
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Stevens points out that achieving a regulatory and negotiated treaty for 
cyberspace is not something easy, given the various opposite interests at 
play, especially between the US and Russia, and accordingly he concludes 
by stating that one possibility is the achievement of norms of acceptable use 
rather that of non-use, thus something not even close to the taboo that 
developed regarding nuclear weapons.48 
 
Mazanec’s work finds a link with that of Stevens. Mazanec analysing the 
possibility of the emergence of norms for cyberspace adopting a refined 
norms life cycle theoretical framework, a central one within the 
constructivist literature, focuses on official US cyberspace strategies (partly 
the same as those in Stevens’ article) to highlight what the US interests are 
regarding cyberspace capabilities and power. He argues that due to the 
perceived interests transpiring from the documents, official statements, and 
other empirical evidence, it does seem that the emergence of constraining 
norms is not in the US interest, a conclusion similar to what hinted by 
Stevens.49 Precisely because on the emergence of so-called “cyber norms” a 
vast literature exists,50  ranging from more critical to simply descriptive 
                                                 
48 Tim Stevens, “A Cyberwar of Ideas? Deterrence and Norms in Cyberspace”, 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33, No. 1 (April, 2012). 148 - 170. 
49 Brian M. Mazanec, The Evolution of Cyber War: International Norms for 
Emerging-Technology Weapons (Potomac Books, November 1, 2015), Chapter 6. 
50 Besides the works of Stevens and Mazanec, see also: Tim Maurer, Cyber norm 
emergence at the United Nations - An Analysis of the Activities at the UN 
Regarding Cyber-security (Discussion Paper #2011-11 Explorations in Cyber 
International Relations Discussion Paper Series Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, 2011); Roger Hurwitz, “A New Normal? The Cultivation of 
Global Norms as Part of a Cybersecurity Strategy”, in Conflict and Cooperation in 
Cyberspace The Challenge to National Security, edited by Panayotis A. 
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articles, and the argument presented in the present thesis standing also 
without directly engaging with it, such a specific topic has been left out of 
the analysis. 
 
Chen also focuses on key official US documents concerning cyberspace and 
cybersecurity, some of which are the same also covered by Stevens and 
Mazanec. Chen's work is compelling because, despite not approaching such 
primary sources through a theoretical framework, it offers a rather rich 
picture on the evolution putting each strategy vis-à-vis its preceding ones. 
Already from the start, Chen highlights how some specific key themes 
repeat themselves across various official strategies, namely “a need for 
public-private sector cooperation, reduction of vulnerabilities, more cyber 
security training, and international cooperation”,51 and part of his analysis 
indeed seeks to highlight those themes that the 2011 DOD's Strategy for 
Operating in Cyberspace reprises from previous strategies. In total Chen’s 
analysis focuses on the following documents, most of which also form part 
of the set of primary sources chosen in the present dissertation: the 2003 
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace; the 2004 Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 
National Military Strategy of the United States of America; the 2006 Joint 
Chiefs of Staff’s National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations 
(NMS-CO); the 2008 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 
                                                                                                                                
Yannakogeorgos and Adam B. Lowther (Taylor & Francis, 2014), 233 - 264; Emilio 
Iasiello, “What Happens If Cyber Norms Are Agreed To?”, Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall/Winter, 2016), 30 - 37. 
51 Thomas M. Chen, An assessment of the Department of Defense Strategy for 
Operating in Cyberspace - The Letort Papers (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 
Army War College Press, 2013), 2. 
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(CNCI); the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace; and finally of 
course the 2011 DOD's Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. Chen analysis 
of the 2011 DOD’s strategy concludes that through such document the US 
clearly signalled some specific messages. Firstly, that DOD will maintain 
superiority in cyberspace, and secondly, that cooperation with the private 
sector and allies and like-minded states is crucial. Overall, Chen argues that 
such strategy falls short under several aspects since it is “not clear about 
priorities, futuristic vision, progress metrics, or enforcement and 
accountability”.52 
 
Barnard-Wills and Ashenden, studying the cyber-discourse adopting the 
“govermentality” theory derived from Foucault, analyse one key document 
published by the Obama Administration in 2009, the so-called Cyberspace 
Policy Review. Not directly taken into account in the present dissertation, 
such a document highlights the importance cybersecurity reached during 
the Obama presidency, stressing the importance to reach specific defensive 
capabilities, as well as “encouraging research, development, and training in 
cyber security”.53 
 
Overall, of most importance for the present dissertation is the work of 
Saltzman who, adopting a redefined Offense-Defense balance theory to 
accommodate cyberspace showing the prominence of offense over defence, 
analyses the US cyber strategic posture. Through an analysis of key officials 
documents between 2003 and 2011 (mostly the same as the already 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 36. 
53 Barnard-Wills and Ashenden, “Securing Virtual Space”, 113. 
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mentioned works), Saltzman argues that the US seems to be showing a 
strategic posture characterised by a “paradoxically defensive nature”, or in 
other words by a general defensive tone constellated by some ambiguity 
and occasional hints of offensive reasoning.54 Regarding the US, Saltzman 
concludes by saying that “[t]he intellectual evolutionary process pursued by 
officials in the military and civil branches of government is still ongoing, 
and the United States is far from having a comprehensive cyber strategy”.55 
 
Finally, regarding US official strategies, recently scholars have focused on 
the latest DOD’s Cyber Strategy. Fore example, Myauo in her analysis of 
such DOD’s strategy also touches upon some other regulations and official 
documents published by the US federal government and White House, 
focusing especially on critical infrastructure protection. Her analysis 
mainly deals with the DOD’s strategy’s call to partnerships between 
CYBERCOM and governments, academia, and industry. From a rather non-
theoretical approach, Myauo focuses on the possibilities partnerships 
between the military and other civil institutions, for example on the so-
called IT portfolio and predictive analytics, could have in enhancing the 
“overall resiliency of U.S. networks and systems”.56 
 
2.4. Is it possible to speak of a gap? - main take away from the literature 
 
                                                 
54 Saltzman, “Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense Balance”. 
55 Ibid., 56. 
56 Michele Myauo, “The U.S. Department of Defense Cyber Strategy: A Call to 
Action for Partnership”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 
3, (Fall/Winter, 2016), 21 - 29, 27. 
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This literature review has shown that already much has been written on 
topics of interest for the present thesis. Indeed, the author believes that 
speaking of a gap, as in an entirely blank spot within the literature, might 
not be entirely correct. The arguments, insights, and context transpiring 
from the mentioned literature entries need to be understood as vines onto 
which the thesis latches; indeed, for the sake of its own dissertation the 
author owns very much to them. 
 
As shown, various scholars approached the discourse from a rather critical 
point of view, highlighting how the processes of social construction of 
threats have been utilised to justify specific actions and policies. Further, in 
analysing the “militarization" historical moment, scholars already have 
provided some insights regarding the US starting to go offensive within the 
cyber domain, clarifying however that a degree of restraint and a focus on 
norm promotion seem to be guiding such a country’s approach to 
cybersecurity, with a holistic and complete strategy missing. Finally, 
analyses of official documents dealings precisely with the cyber medium 
and threats spawning from it have been produced. 
 
Despite all that, some room does exist for pushing the knowledge a bit 
forward. The works of both Saltzman and Chen, which take into account 
many official documents, juxtaposing them to better understand the 
evolution of US strategic thinking, can be further extended implementing 
new documents released posthumous of such two scholarly works. For 
instance, the “paradoxical defensive nature” thesis brought forward by 
Saltzman can be tested on such new empirical material. In addition, 
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whether most of the articles focusing on the analysis of discourse state their 
theoretical and methodological groundings, the majority of those 
addressing key US official documents fail to address the specific kind of 
methodology implemented. Arguably, since they all deal with written 
primary sources, they all adopt some form of discourse analysis, still this 
lack of methodological rigour calls for more methodological-driven 
analyses. 
 
However most of all, what truly seems to be missing is an initial analysis 
that studies the US approach to cyberspace from a more ideational point of 
view. Indeed, to the author’s knowledge, the conceptualisation adopted in 
this work still has not been presented within the literature. For instance, 
this somewhat gap is precisely the one the present thesis seeks to “close”. 
Scholars already appreciated the fact that during the “militarization” phase 
states have moved onto more offensive postures regarding the adoption of 
cyber-related technologies and medium itself. The present thesis starts 
from such a context and empirical argumentations, approaching such an 
analysis from a rather different theoretical and methodological perspective. 
As better explained in the upcoming chapters, despite the adoption of a 
discourse analysis, focus is posed on themes and on the role norms have in 
informing an actor’s approach to a technology and medium. In other words, 
by grounding a thematic-discourse analysis within Constructivism and 
strategic culture, the present thesis’ humble contribution is that of 
producing new knowledge on whether it is possible to appreciate a “shift” 
within the US “cyber strategic culture”, taking as empirical proofs 
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especially the concept of “active cyber defence" (ACD) measures, the 2015 
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3. Theoretical background of the thesis 
 
The present chapter outlines the theoretical background of the thesis, or in 
other words the theories from which it draws inspirations and insights. 
Overall, key tenets of Constructivism and Strategic Culture research 
tradition do form the theoretical ground onto which the dissertation 
latches, especially regarding the power norms have to shape/inform 
political and strategic behaviour, hence culture. The present chapter firstly 
introduces some key characteristics of such two research and theoretical 
traditions, then concluding with a description of the framework followed 




Onuf firstly introduced the term Constructivism at the end of the 1980s.57 
As one key meta-theoretical approach to the study of IR and security, 
Constructivism saw the light mirroring a sense of dissatisfaction felt by 
scholars towards more classical IR theories, which were deemed unfit to 
thoroughly explain some key specific historical moments that happened 
since the end of the Cold War.58 The starting point of Constructivism is 
indeed a critique of the rationalist and materialist assumptions at the 
bottom of both realism and liberalism. Rather than understanding actors as 
                                                 
57 Nicolas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations (Routledge, 2012). 
58 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: 
Theories and Approaches (Oxford University Press, 4th edition, April 19, 2010), 
162. 
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utility-maximising ones, constructivists conceive them as social ones, 
stressing the importance of non-material milieus,59 “such as ideas, norms, 
knowledge, [and] culture”.60 Point of departure for constructivists is indeed 
the conception that meaning is “socially constructed”.61 In opposition to the 
individualist ontology characterising rationalist approaches, constructivists 
are entrenched in a social ontology, which asserts that actors (domestic and 
international) “cannot be separated from a context of normative meaning 
which shapes who they are and the possibilities available to them”.62 For 
instance, the international system itself is not something given, but rather 
something that “exists only as an intersubjective awareness among people, 
constituted by ideas, [rather than only] material forces”.63 Scholars of such a 
school of thought are interested in uncovering how a particular meaning is 
achieved, and how this then influence/informs politics. In other words, 
constructivists seek to give better explanations and analyses on how both 
material and ideational factors speak to each other in providing various 
possibilities and outcomes of political action.64 Accordingly, the analysed 
process of constitution is understood as causal, “since how things are put 
                                                 
59 Mike Bourne, Understanding Security (Palgrave, 2014 edition), 51. 
60 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “TAKING STOCK: The Constructivist 
Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politic”, Annual 
Review of Political Science, Vol. 4 (June, 2001), 391 - 416, 392. 
61 Ian Hurd, “Constructivism”, in The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations, edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University 
Press Inc., 2010), 298 - 316, 300. 
62 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories 
(Oxford University, 2013), 190. 
63  Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations,162. Emphasis in 
the original. 
64 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 189. 
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together makes possible, or even probable, certain kinds of political 
behaviour and effect”.65 
 
Wendt, a key figure within such meta-theoretical approach, argues that 
“anarchy is what states make of it”,66 underlying that international actors 
seek security by interpreting both capabilities and intentions of their 
counterparts. In doing so, they are guided by their own identities, specific 
values, and types of behaviour seen as natural or desirable, which are not 
given, but produced and re-produced precisely during such process of 
interpretation. 67  Therefore, for constructivists the entire international 
system is socially constituted, built on ideational factors rather than 
material ones, open to change and evolution. Overall, the actions of states 
not only shape the arena in which they exist, but while doing so their own 
identities and interests are formed as well. This is the logic of co-
constitution, or in other words the “logic of appropriateness”, which drives 
the constructivism understanding of the relationship existing between 
structures and agents.68 
 
When studying such a process, many constructivists have focused their 
attention on “norms”, independent variables either international or 
                                                 
65 Finnemore and Sikkink, "TAKING STOCK”, 394. 
66 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), 391 - 
425. 
67 Bourne, Understanding Security, 51; Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of 
it”, 392; Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 168. 
68 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 190; Hurd, 
“Constructivism”, 304. 
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domestic “that can influence international behaviour”,69 shaping “realms of 
possibility”. 70  Norms have been conceptualised in various similar ways, 
with a rather accepted and utilised one found in Katzenstein who 
understands them as “collective expectations about proper behaviour of 
actors for a given identity”,71 therefore “prescriptions or proscriptions for 
behaviour”. 72  Moreover, it must be understood that norms do not 
necessarily determine outcomes, but rather constitute or create what have 
been called “realms of possibility.73 For the sake of the analysis carried out 
in the present thesis, the definition offered by Farrell is taken as most valid. 
He conceptualises norms as “intersubjective beliefs about the social and 
natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of 
action[, which are] reproduced through social practice”.74 Different kind of 
norms are said to exist according to their effects; whether regulative ones 
constrain already existing activities; constitutive ones define “the set of 
practices that make up any particular consciously organized social activity 
[specifying] what counts as that activity”.75 Or, as Finnemore and Sikkink 
                                                 
69 Mazanec, The Evolution of Cyber War: International Norm for Emerging-
Technology Weapons, Chapter 1. 
70 Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative 
Basis of Nuclear Non-Use”, International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Summer, 
1999), 433 - 468, 435. 
71 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, 
Identity, and Culture in National Security”, in The Culture of National Security: 
Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), 33 - 75, 34. 
72 Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo”, 436. 
73 Ibid., 435. 
74 Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program”, 
International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring, 2002), 49 - 72, 49. 
75 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (New York: Routledge, 
1998), 22. 
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put it, “regulative norms […] order and constrain behavior, [while] 
constitutive norms […] create new actors, interests, or categories of 
action”.76 Constructivists are mainly interested in the second ones, since in 
following the logic of appropriateness they argue that norms go “all the 
way down”, creating and defining actors’ identities and interests,77 as well 
as the rules and practices deemed acceptable on the international stage.78 
The fact that norms precede international actors’ interest is what 
distinguishes Constructivism from other approaches. 
 
Within the field of security studies, seminal works grouped within the 
famous edited volume The Culture of National Security, all demonstrate 
the role various social structures play in reshaping “actor’s interests, self-
understanding, and behavior”, 79  highlighting therefore that “security 
interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors”,80 or in 
other words, the causal effects norms do have within state actors.  
 
3.2. Strategic culture  
 
                                                 
76 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkin, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn, 1998), 887 - 
917, 891. 
77 Stevens, “A Cyberwar of Ideas?”, 155. 
78 Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies”, 52. 
79 Finnemore and Sikkink, "TAKING STOCK”, 396. 
80 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National 
Security”, in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), 1 - 32, 2. 
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The focus on ideational factors, such as culture and norms indeed, arguably 
constitutes the bridge linking Constructivism to studies of strategic culture. 
In fact, during the 1990, constructivists somewhat gave new nourishment 
to a research agenda that had fallen in disarray after the end of the Cold 
War. Further, as clarified by Hurd, focusing on norms does not regardlessly 
exclude the possibility to approach also the study of strategic behaviour, 
indeed many constructivists approach power and interest similarly to 
realists, agreeing that international actors behave in pursing perceived 
interests, as well as arguing that separating the study of the logic of 
consequence from that of the logic of appropriateness is a mistake.81 
 
The study of strategic culture within the broader security studies literature 
can be traced back to Snyder’s seminal work on Soviet and American 
nuclear doctrine, published in 1977 by the Rand corporation.82  After a 
drawback right at the end of the Cold War, especially during the 1990s, 
and somewhat recently, such field of study got reinvigorated, being applied 
to a variety of case studies, moving away from the exclusive focus on 
nuclear weapons. Overall, scholars adopting the concept of strategic culture 
have been interested in analysing and building frameworks through which 
explain the strategic behaviours adopted by international actors vis-à-vis 
their peculiar strategic properties. 83  Further, through the application of 
                                                 
81 Hurd, “Constructivism”, 310. 
82 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear 
Operations (Santa Monica: RAND, 1977). 
83 Edward Lock, “Strategic Culture Theory: What, Why, and How”, Oxford 
Research Encyclopedia of Politics, September 26, 2017 (accessed May 2018), 
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such concept, scholars seek to understand and explain continuity and 
change within the chosen case studies’ national security policies. Within 
the literature it is often pointed out that the term strategic culture, despite 
being constantly used, still remains surrounded by a high degree of 
confusion, with many definitions and approaches to it currently existing.84 
Indeed, three key schools or “generations” exist, each differing on specific 
epistemological premises, 85  with a fierce on-going debate especially 
between two of such “generations”, the first and third one, respectively 
lead by Gray and Johnston. 
In general terms, strategic culture can be defined as “the set of beliefs, 
assumptions, attitudes, norms, world views and patterns of habitual 
behaviour held by strategic decision-makers regarding the political 
objectives of war, and the best way to achieve it”.86 In line with this view, 
Johnston understands the concept of strategic culture as “an ideational 
milieu which limits behavioral choices”;87  an independent variable that 
helps explaining behaviour. Johnston's approach is strongly grounded in a 
positivist philosophical position finding a link with Popper’s falsification 
theory. From such premises, Johnston indeed argues that “theories positing 




85 Edward Lock, “Refining strategic culture: Return of the second generation”, 
Review of International Studies, Vol, 36, No. 3 (2010), 685 - 708. 
86 Yithzak Klein, “A theory of strategic culture”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 10, 
No. 1 (1991), 3 - 23, 3; Alessia Biava, Margriet Drent, and Graeme Herd, 
“Characterizing the European Union’s Strategic Culture: An Analytical 
Framework”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 49, No. 6 (2011), 1227 - 
1248, 1228. 
87 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 
Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 46. 
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the influence of strategic culture on actions should be ‘falsifiable’, or at least 
distinguishable from non-strategic culture variables”. 88  Contrary to 
Johnston, Gray contends that strategic culture “comprises the persisting 
(but not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions and habits 
of mind and preferred methods of operation [so, behavioural patterns] that 
are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security 
community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience”. 89 
Therefore, culture needs to be understood as “context”,90 as something that 
“goes all the way down” in comprising and pervading political actors’ 
behaviour. 91  According to this view, it is wrong to artificially detach 
culture from behaviour, hence that studying strategic culture through the 
adoption of positivist methods of social science is not possible.92 Whether 
Johnston appears to approach culture as an independent causal variable 
useful to analyse and predict change in strategic choices, Gray sees culture 
as a context, which helps scholars understanding both reasons and 
motivations lying at the base of actors’ actions. 93  This is precisely the 
Johnston-Gray debate, an on-going intellectual competition on whether 
the concept of strategic culture determines or rather shapes strategic 
                                                 
88 Christoph O. Meyer, "Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A 
Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms”, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2005), 523 - 549, 527. 
89 Colin Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory 
Strikes Back”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1999), 49 - 69, 51; 
Alan Bloomfield, "Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture 
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decision-making. 
 
3.3. Theoretical insights driving the present research agenda 
 
Precisely an agenda rooted in the study of strategic culture, with insights 
also from Constructivism, is what the present thesis is seeking to follow 
when analysing the US approach to (national) cybersecurity. Following 
such an agenda is important and pertinent since it usually asks one key 
question also asked in the present thesis, namely “What are the ideational 
foundations of national security policy?”. 94  As already mentioned, the 
author introduces and utilises the term “cyber strategic culture”. Such a 
term indicates the ideational milieu constituted of and informed/mirrored 
by symbols, ideas, and ultimately norms, 95  displaying the strategic 
behaviours deemed best to be adopted on matters linked to national 
cybersecurity. Overall, the conceptualisation of strategic culture given by 
Meyer is deemed best for the present thesis, "the socially transmitted, 
identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared 
among a broad majority of actors and social groups within a given security 
community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s 
pursuit of security and defence goals”. 96  Here lies the cautious-
Constructivist approach of the present work, namely the study on those 
                                                 
94 Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism”, in 
Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights Into 
Comparative National Security Policymaking, edited by Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry 
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ideational structures that participate in informing and mirroring actors' 
strategic choices and behaviours. The approach is in line with conventional 
constructivism, since the aim of the present work is not fully critical,97 and 
also cautious since no claims of causality are directly made, with the debate 
on the logic of appropriateness and consequences also left aside. Moreover, 
the present thesis does not engage with international norms, but rather 
extrapolates those that seem to be guiding the US by analysing its “cyber 
strategic culture", which transpires from the assessed primary sources. 
Finally, whether traditional strategic culture studies have mainly analysed 
behaviours regarding the use or non use of military force, the present thesis 
expands such a focus also on strategic choices not directly involving the use 
of force, as better outlined further down. 
The following chapter further explains from a technical-methodological 
point of view how such research program is achieved, focusing mainly on 






                                                 
97 Reus-Smit argues that Constructivism is split in two camps; between those who 
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4. Methodology adopted to deliver the stated thesis’ goal 
 
The present chapter aims at outlining the kind of practical methodology 
utilised in the present thesis to reach its goal. In building a bridge with the 
mentioned constructivism meta-theoretical approach, a methodology 
grounded in the qualitative research tradition centred on the analysis of 
discourse and themes has been chosen. Besides explaining the 
characteristics and reasons of such a methodology, the present chapter also 
offers elucidations regarding the selected case study, the primary sources 
utilised, and the overall limitations of the dissertation itself.  
Having a section delineating the methodology utilised is rather important 
since it helps achieving a certain degree of transparency, which is key in 
every academic type of work.  
The present chapter proceeds as following: firstly, the case study selected is 
covered; secondly, information regarding the data corpus is given; thirdly, 
focus is posed on the discourse-thematic approach; and lastly, the 
limitations of the dissertation are discussed. 
 
4.1. Case selection 
 
The present dissertation focuses on one specific international actor, namely 
the United States of America. Such a choice was dictated by several reasons. 
Within the international arena many other states figure as prominent 
regarding cyber-related issues, and indeed scholars also placed their 
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academic lenses over countries such as Russia,98 China,99 Japan,100 Germany, 
France, and the United Kingdom,101 as well as on minor ones, such as the 
Baltic and Visegrád Group ones.102 All of these in fact have recently been 
started publishing official documents and strategies that deal with 
cybersecurity and cyber-related issues, providing scholars with more 
primary data to work with.  
Nevertheless, the choice has fallen on the US mainly because of its 
prominent role in the “cyber-international arena”, hence in discussions 
linked to cybersecurity, cyber warfare, cyber power etc., in various 
international fora, and especially at the UN. 
Moreover, the US as a country is one of the ones that most relies on such a 
man-made domain, with its society being highly digitalised, both at the 
private and public level, something that places it in a peculiar position 
regarding its overall cybersecurity and cyber power, therefore a truly 
interesting case from an analytical point of view. Indeed, given its historical 
link to the creation of the Internet, the debate regarding its usage and 
governance, and its overall importance for the wellbeing and prosperity of 
the country, made the US one of the first ones to publish specific official 
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documents dealing with the cyber medium, being nowadays the richest 
international actor in terms of the quantity of such documents publicly 
available. According to some experts, the US "has been in the vanguard of 
developing cyber security policy and strategy”, 103  also being the main 
“sender of ideas” regarding IT problems and solutions.104 
Finally, on a more personal level, the choice was guided by the author’s 
language competencies. Given that the US is an English speaking country, 
the assessed primary documents are all written in such a language, as 
opposite to other countries that might publish in English only reduced 
versions of their official documents, something that would limit the overall 
research.105 
 
4.2. Gathered and utilised data sources 
 
Regarding the data utilised for the present thesis, it has been extracted from 
both primary and secondary sources. Whether the gathered primary 
sources have been utilised to conduct the further discussed thematic 
analysis, the secondary ones have provided valuable data through which 
                                                 
103 Piret Pernik et al., National Cyber Security Organisation: United States 
(Tallinn, NATO CCD COE, 2016). Available at: 
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104 Cavelty Dunn, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics, 9.  
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possibility always present, therefore exclusive of translated versions. For instance, 
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the wider public. 
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further push the thesis’ overall argument(s), and draw more insights 
especially on the concept of “active cyber deference” (ACD) measures. 
 
Regarding the primary sources, the author has gathered and analysed key 
official security and military strategies published by both the White House 
and the Military apparatus since the early 2000s, which either partially or 
completely deal with cyberspace, cybersecurity, and cyber warfare -related 
matters. Therefore, the sources utilised are all of textual nature. The reason 
why focus has been posed to such kind of documents is easily discernible 
and closely linked to the thesis overall goals. As discussed in previous 
sections, the present dissertation aims at analysing the evolution of the US 
strategic thinking regarding cyberspace, or in other words grasp the 
evolution of what has been called the US “cyber strategic culture”. 
Arguably, to acknowledge the strategic thinking of a country, or its 
strategic culture, the researcher should focus on security strategies, which 
despite not being politically nor legally binding in nature, can be regarded 
as frameworks guiding a state external and internal actions vis-à-vis a wide 
range of threats, also containing the means and conditions to fulfil certain 
purposes.106 For instance, Lauterbach, to trace the US strategic culture and a 
possible shift of it within the context of the Iraq War, as primary sources 
                                                 
106 Julia Klohs and Arne Niemann, “Comparing the US National Security Strategy 
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utilises strategies and doctrines.107 Moreover, (if possible) focus should be 
posed also on transcripts of decision-making processes, participants’ 
memoirs, and elite interviews, as they allow to dive deeper within the 
mechanisms at work at the strategic level of a country. 
 
The primary documents making up the data corpus have been retrieved 
online; downloaded either directly from the White House and Department 
of Defense,108 or from related and third-party websites. In total, twelve 
official texts have been utilised within the research.109 Such number might 
not seem large enough, however at this point in history not many more 
similar documents seem to be available. Further, during the research 
process the author came to the conclusion that implementing more primary 
sources would have failed in adding value to the analysis, not really altering 
nor challenging the obtained results. For instance, as an example, 
documents produced by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have 
been left out. Nonetheless, for the sake of transparency some other primary 
documents that have not been directly taken into account are briefly 
pointed out in an upcoming chapter. Moreover, it must be said that among 
                                                 
107 Lauterbach, “Constructivism, Strategic Culture, and the Iraq War” 
108 The websites are the following: www.whitehouse.gov and www.defense.gov.  
109 In chronological order, the primary documents are the following: The National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace; The National Military Strategy of the United States 
of America 2004; The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations; the 
National Security Strategy 2010; The National Military Strategy of the United 
States of America 2011; the International Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. 
Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World; The Department of 
Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace; Presidential Policy Directive No. 
20; the National Security Strategy 2015; The DOD Cyber Strategy; The National 
Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015; and the National Security 
Strategy 2017. 
 
  52 
all the selected primary sources two were secretive in nature. The first one 
is the 2006 National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations and the 
second one is the Presidential Policy Directive No. 20 (PPD-20). The first 
one was officially declassified under the “Freedom of Information Act” 
(FOIA), while the second one, despite not being officially made available to 
the wider public opinion, was publicly disclosed and shared by the whistle-
blower Edward Snowden during his campaign of leaks.110 The author is 
conscious that utilising secretive documents might go against academic 
standards and rules; however, if the 2006 document has been officially 
unclassified, PPD-20 has already been empirically used by academics,111 
being also rather important for the analysis conducted in the present 
dissertation.  
Finally, to the reader it might seem that the actual analysis only is carried 
out on some documents, since some specific ones stand out, with sub-
chapters entirely dedicated to them. However, the chosen methodology has 
been applied to all primary sources, with the majority of them having been 
grouped together. 
As for the secondary sources, several main types of documents have been 
assessed and gathered. For instance, from the academic world, books and 
articles published by prominent journals and publishing houses have been 
gathered, with pieces of information extrapolated from them. The same has 
been done for news articles published on various online newspapers, as 
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well as from some documents containing policy recommendations 
published by either think thanks. Articles published in academic journals 
have been mainly retrieved through the online portals of the Glasgow and 
Charles universities’ libraries. Specific keywords linked to the thesis main 
topics have been utilised to speed up the research process, with some key 
journals being directly assessed through their own websites. In addition, 
books have been either directly downloaded from the Internet or accessed 
on digital reading application, or physically consulted at such two 
universities’ libraries. As for news and think thanks’ articles, they have 
been retrieved and downloaded online through searches made utilising the 
Google search engine. 
 
4.3. Qualitative research tradition 
 
With the word “quality” referring “to the what, how, when, and where of a 
thing […], [q]ualitative research [appears to be closely linked to] the 
meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and 
descriptions of things”.112 Not surprisingly, in a rather straightforward and 
common sense way, qualitative methods have been defined as “data 
collection and analysis strategies that rely upon the collection of, and 
analysis of, non-numeric data”.113 
 
                                                 
112 Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research for the Social Sciences (Pearson, 4th 
edition, 2001), 3. 
113 Christopher Lamont, Research Methods in International Relations (SAGE 
Publications Ltd, 1st edition, May 20, 2015) [Kindle Edition], 77.  
 
  54 
Given the present thesis’ focus on the analysis and interpretation of a rather 
contained set of written textual primary sources, it makes sense to 
methodologically ground it within the tradition of qualitative research, 
which in the field of IR studies, according to some, is the predominant 
one,114 also from a “technical" point of view. 
 
4.4. Discourse analysis 
 
Central to the overall methodology adopted within the dissertation is the 
role played by discourse and its analysis. Discourse analysis is a vast field 
encompassing several methods, which are grounded in as many theories 
and philosophies, especially Constructivism, as seen in the literature 
review. Also in the present thesis the study of discourse is linked to such IR 
and security studies school of thought. 
 
The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines discourse, among others, 
as “a mode of organizing knowledge, ideas, or experience that is rooted in 
language and its concrete contexts (such as history or institutions)”. 115 
Similarly, the thesis understands discourse as a vehicle capable of shaping 
actors’ “boundaries of the possible”,116 which “guide[s] political action[s] by 
denoting appropriate or plausible behaviour in light of an agreed 
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environment”.117 Or better, as “structures of signification which construct 
social realities[,] make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting 
towards, the world [as well as pushing forward] a particular ‘regime of 
truth’ while excluding other possible modes of identity and action”.118 
 
National strategies are official texts, which do not have a political nor legal 
binding power. Nonetheless, since such documents are produced and 
published by governmental and other national bodies, they do signal the 
range of behaviours that form a state’s conduct vis-à-vis states priorities and 
domestic, regional, and global context. Put simply, national strategies can 
be considered as guiding frameworks for actions, 119  sharing such 
possibilities through discourse.  
It must be pointed out that due to their nature and drafting and revising 
processes such documents go through, they often are “semantically 
neutral”, lacking in metaphors or other semantic constructions. Due to such 
a characteristic, adopting key techniques often used when conducting 
critical discourse analysis might not be feasible. Nevertheless, national 
strategies do contain specific discourses that might dominate over others. In 
this case, a student might look at what is missing, as in words or specific 
                                                 
117 Ibid. 
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expressions, rather than at what is present within a text, to uncover what 
kind of specific behaviour the discourse legitimates.120  
 
Overall, the aim of the discourse analysis applied within the thesis is not 
critical, it does not aim at proving that certain power dynamics are being 
normalised or justified, precisely because the primary sources utilised do 
not really lend themselves to such an analysis. For instance, it does not seek 
to replicate some of the works cited within the literature review, which 
drawing from critical Constructivism explored the way cyber-related issues 
have been framed in specific ways to justify some specific actions and 
behaviours. Rather, it approaches discourse understanding it as a social 
structure, a milieu, through which norms informing a strategic culture 
travel. In other words, it conceptualises it as the vehicle through which 
recorded beliefs (norms) are shared, thus where physical traces of them can 
be grasped.121  
 
Finally, whether “full-fledged” constructivists underline that language itself 
it socially constructed, pointing out that an “objective” basis through which 
identify material reality is lacking, the present thesis rejects such fully 
interpretative conceptualisation, embracing a more positivist stance 
towards discourse. Accordingly, in carrying out the analysis the idea that 
objects of enquiry “can exist independently of the analyst [and] consensus 
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about the nature of the world [being] possible in the long run" is 
followed.122 
 
The aim is to extrapolate those words and passages that convey specific 
actions, then clustering them together under two specific “macro thematic 
categories” to achieve the mentioned thematic discourse methodology.   
 
4.5. Thematic analysis  
 
Already from its name, it is clear that thematic analysis deals with the 
discovery of themes, being indeed often described as “a method for 
identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data[, and 
which] minimally organises and describes [a] data set in (rich) detail”.123 
 
Within the literature, a veil of ambiguity seems to surround the concept of 
thematic analysis. Scholars have indeed pointed out that such a method 
“has been poorly [or not at all] branded”,124 and often understood as being 
part of more common and widely utilised qualitative methods of enquiry.125 
In other words, as a tool researchers can turn to when conducting their 
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qualitative analyses,126  rather than as a standalone technique to analyse 
data. Paradoxically, precisely due to such poor branding and extensive 
(unconscious) use, thematic analysis is said to “possibly [be] the most 
widely used qualitative method of data analysis”.127 
 
Despite such branding issue, scholars have argued that thematic analysis 
deserves to be under the spotlight within the qualitative research tradition 
since it provides researchers with skills useful to then conduct other more 
complex qualitative enquiries.128  
 
Thematic analysis fits the present dissertation for many reasons. One is its 
flexibility and theoretical freedom. Within the literature it has been 
pointed out that thematic analysis is truly valuable to those researchers 
who still are building experience on both theory and knowledge regarding 
qualitative approaches. 129  Further, given its flexibility, thematic analysis 
lends itself to a wide application across many fields and, most of all, to 
various epistemologies. Secondly, since the present work does not utilise a 
too broad set of primary sources, nor the data extrapolated from them is too 
vast, thematic analysis has been chosen for the present research since it is 
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said to be applicable to both small and medium-sized sets of data. 130 
Thirdly, it appears that thematic analysis is most useful when applied to an 
entire data set, rather than within single data items.131 In other words, it 
works best when used to analyse recurrent patterns among a set of primary 
sources, rather than within one specific source, something in line with the 
aim of the present thesis. And finally, most important of all, thematic 
analysis has been chosen in the present dissertation since it offers 
researchers a rather clear structure to adopt when analysing the data that 
leads to the highlighting of themes. Given that the research intends to 
analyse two themes present within the US “cyber strategic culture” in order 
to evaluate whether an evolution took place since the early 2000s, thematic 
analysis does feel as one of the best techniques to adopt. 
 
Traditionally, thematic analysis has been presented as a rather linear 6-step 
process, involving specific phases, each building on the preceding one, 
which in brief are the following: 1) familiarising with the data; 2) 
generating initial codes; 3) searching for themes; 4) reviewing themes; 5) 
defining and naming themes; 6) writing the report.132  
 
Having clear and structured methodological framework is important since 
it helps conveying analytical clarity and trustworthiness, however as it 
often happens within the qualitative research tradition, such a path ends up 
being more tortuous, with researchers moving back and forth throughout it 
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in an iterative and reflective manner,133 a situation that manifested itself 
also while working on the present dissertation. Moreover, in carrying out 
the analysis of the primary sources, such a rather strict and rigid framework 
has been revisited and modelled according to the characteristics of the 
utilised primary sources and data, as well as to accommodate the thesis’ 
needs. As further explained, some passages have been revisited and cut. 
 
Coding involves “taking text data […] gathered during data collection, 
segmenting sentences (or paragraphs) […] into categories, and labelling 
those categories with a term”.134 Precisely the action of labelling is what 
permits the researcher to then build a thematic map in which the coded 
material is interpreted and placed under a specific theme. A process that 
overall appears to be applicable to a large variety of data. However, after an 
initial reading of the primary sources, the author has concluded that the 
process of coding might not be suitable to them. Indeed, within the 
strategies, specific passages and words linked to the field of cybersecurity 
connote some rather straightforward concepts or behaviours, leaving little 
room for an action of labelling or tagging, since specific words found 
within the documents act as labels themselves. Further, the author has 
come to the conclusion that many of the practices and actions presented in 
the primary sources overlap, something that would then produce codes 
without explicit boundaries, but rather redundant and interchangeable, 
                                                 
133 Nowell, et al. “Thematic Analysis”, 4. 
134 John W. Creswell, Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed 
methods approaches (SAGE Publications, Inc, 3rd edition, July 15, 2008), 186. 
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characteristics that should be avoided when producing codes.135 Overall, 
rather than coding the data the author has surveyed it looking for specific 
discursive categories, passages and words that, as mentioned, carry a 
specific connotation derived from the cybersecurity field, which reoccur 
throughout the entire set of gathered data. Once gathered, the author has 
proceeded in clustering them under some specific sub-themes. Whether 
key words, expressions, and passages in the texts have been deemed rather 
straightforward in meaning, others have been set aside within an “in need 
of further interpretation” box, better evaluated vis-à-vis the gathered and 
utilised “technical” literature in cybersecurity and highlighted historical 
context. Given the nature of the practices and measures examined, the 
boundaries among some sub-themes are indeed blurred, a limitation that 
however is overcome by simplifying things, as explained in more details in 
the next chapter.     
 
One final note regarding the sub-themes: drawing from qualitative content 
analysis, the number of times such discursive categories are repeated 
throughout the gathered data has been counted.136 
Qualitative content analysis presupposes that specific terms maintain their 
meaning over time; the author believes that such an approach is able to 
provide further methodological rigour to the present dissertation 
methodology since within the cybersecurity field some words and 
expressions, as found within the primary sources, are commonly linked to 
                                                 
135 Jennifer Attride-Stirling, ”Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative 
research”, Qualitative Research, Vol. 1, No, 3 (2001), 385 - 405, 391. 
136 Klohs and Niemann, “Comparing the US National Security Strategy and the 
European Security Strategy in the first decade of the 21st century”, 7. 
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specific actions, and understanding, that have not really changed over time. 
Adopting such method of enquiry grants the possibility to better assess 
whether specific terms and passages repeat themselves across the strategies. 
Such counting gives an initial glimpse into the degree of “intertextuality” of 
the selected data, helping visualising US cyber strategic thinking across 
time. 
 
Once the sub-themes have been refined, the author has proceeded in 
sorting them under two opposite “normative thematic categories”.  
 
Such two thematic categories have been built following both an a-priori 
and inductive approach. When engaging the primary sources, the author 
already started with some initial knowledge on the field of cybersecurity 
and strategic thinking; something that produced some initial beliefs and 
ideas on what to look for within the documents. Precisely these initial ideas 
and beliefs have brought the author to conceiving the two “thematic 
normative categories”. A-priori themes, as pointed out by some within the 
literature, tend to come from the characteristics of the topic being studied 
and analysed, as well as from professional definitions present within the 
literature, among others.137 Further, it has been said that researchers can 
indeed argument their choices of a theme by referring to the literature.138 
                                                 
137 Martin Bulmer, “Concepts in the analysis of qualitative data”, Sociological 
Review, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1979), 651 - 677; Anselm L. Strauss, Qualitative analysis 
for social scientists (Cambridge University Press, 1987); Ryan and Bernard, 
“Techniques to Identify Themes”, 88. 
138 Jodi Aronson, “A Pragmatic View of Thematic Analysis”, The Qualitative 
Report, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1995), 1- 3. 
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Moreover, through the analysis of the content of the primary sources, the 
“story” of the “thematic normative categories” have been refined and 
further better explained.   
 
The thesis follows the tradition that sees themes as “abstract entit[ies] that 
brin[g] meaning and identity to a recurrent experience and its variant 
manifestations”.139 Or put in a simpler way, as patterns of meaning that are 
able to capture something important to the overall research end goals,140 
also linking substantial portions of the data together.141 
 
The two “thematic normative categories” have been named “defensiveness” 
and “offensiveness”, as better explained in the upcoming chapter. The 
process of naming themes is a rather key one within thematic analysis, 
something that, as previously showed, is found almost at the end of the 
entire process. Nonetheless, given that in the present dissertation an a-
priori approach was used, the author already had these names (thus 
themes) in mind when approaching the data. During the course of the 
research and writing process, for each of them the “story” they tell has been 
written, in order to further provide clarity to the reader and to the overall 
research process. The author also believes that approaching the data also 
                                                 
139 Lydia DeSantis and Doris Noel Ugarriza, “The Concept of Theme as Used in 
Qualitative Nursing Research”, Western Journal of Nursing Research, Vol. 22, No. 
2 (2000), 351 - 372, 362. 
140 Braun and Clarke, “Using thematic analysis in psychology”. 
141 DeSantis and Ugarriza, “The Concept of Theme as Used in Qualitative Nursing 
Research”; Nowell, et al. “Thematic Analysis”, 8. 
 
  64 
through such a deductive approach helps achieving themes that are 
internally coherent and do not overlap.142 
 
Sorting the sub-themes under the two “thematic normative categories” by 
following also the   chronological order of publication of the various 
primary sources helps understanding the overall evolution of US cyber 
strategic thinking, therefore when one specific norm seems to be informing 
the “cyber strategic culture”. 
 
Within the paper, the expression "normative thematic category/ies” and 
term “theme(s)” are used interchangeably. 
 
4.6. A clarification on ACD and limitations of data and dissertation 
 
Regarding the primary sources, it has been pointed out that despite what 
written in national strategies and official documents, states are still free to 
act differently, given that there might be differences between what an 
international actor signals and what it actually does. Nonetheless, they do 
provide valuable knowledge on how a state and some specific organisations 
within it strategically think regarding a specific domain and issue; hence on 
what kind of norms inform them. Further linked to such sources, 
unfortunately at this moment in history for cybersecurity and cyber 
warfare related matters, access to memoirs and decision-making processes 
is really difficult to achieve, not only due to the novelty of the domain and 
                                                 
142 Braun and Clarke, “Using thematic analysis in psychology”, 94 - 95. 
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strategic thinking about it, but also due to the still large veil of secrecy 
surrounding such processes at the national level. Precisely such a lack of 
more “intimate” data must be understood as a limitation to the analysis. To 
partially overcome such issue, elite interviews could have been set up and 
carried out, however some constraints prevented such a methodological 
technique to be adopted. 
 
Regarding the methodology above-mentioned and the focus posed to so-
called “active cyber defence” (ACD) measures, some more clarification is 
needed. In analysing their nature, the explained methodology has been 
fully applied, with the official discourse being analysed and the concept 
being processed through the two highlighted “thematic normative 
categories”. To further push the analysis on ACD, thoroughly grasping all 
their facets, secondary sources have provided some more technical details 
and shared opinions on it; information that helped the author better 
understand such defensive paradigm’s nature, thus allowing for a better 
interpretation and overall thematic analysis. Indeed, despite the discourse, 
as found in official strategies, only makes part of half the analysis on ACD, 
this latter still has been scrutinised though the two crafted themes. 
Moreover, whether grasping ACD’s nature from opinions found within the 
literature might predispose the author towards certain biases, to further 
achieve objectivity some official US documents more or less linked to such 
concept have been taken into account. 
 
Overall, the data gathered dates back to 2003, the moment when the White 
House published the very first cybersecurity strategy. Of course, the 
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discourse regarding cyberspace, cybersecurity, and cyber warfare is much 
more older, dating back to the 1980s, and especially 1990s (despite at that 
time other expressions and words were utilised to refer to such domain and 
possible military applications within it), as briefly mentioned in the 
literature review. Despite such temporal window taken into account being 
potentially perceived as a limit of the present dissertation, such a choice has 
been made due to time and word count constraints. Such a limit opens up 
more room for research, for instance a possible expansion of the work 
carried out here, comparing its results with those reached when taking into 
account also the two mentioned historical timeframes that came before the 
“militarization” one.  
 
Regarding more technical aspects covered in the present thesis, the author 
being a scholar of IR and security studies does not have the competencies to 
fully explain more technical aspects of cybersecurity and defence. 
Accordingly, he understands that they might have been covered and 
explained in rather simple terms. Nevertheless, despite that potentially 
being perceived as a limit, in the opinion of the author the details given 
suffice in providing clarity for the sake of the argument and analysis 
presented in the dissertation.  
 
Finally, as seen within the literature, scholars have pointed out the fact that 
the US still lacks a comprehensive cyber strategy. Such a “lack” must not be 
interpreted as a potential limit capable of invalidating the research agenda 
followed in the present paper. Having one holistic and comprehensive 
official document would have simplified the research process, providing 
 
  67 
more empirical material to work with; however, the primary sources 
utilised do provide the data onto which apply the chosen methodology and 
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5. Defining the analytical framework - the two “thematic normative 
categories” 
 
As briefly introduced in the chapter on the methodology, two key major 
“thematic normative categories” form the methodological lenses through 
which the data corpus has been analysed. The present chapter aims at 
better explaining the “story” of such themes, presenting their related sub-
themes, explaining also some technical and strategic aspects of those 




The “story” of this theme is one of non-aggressiveness. A discourse 
characterised by measures and practices that neither directly nor overtly 
signal the willingness to harm other actors or their networks, systems, and 
infrastructure. Overall, the literature on cybersecurity offers some initial 
insights into the various measures actors can take to increase the defences 
and security of their networks and systems without directly decreasing that 
of adversaries. Accordingly, a set of a-priori sub-themes has been 
delineated, namely: network security/defence, cyber-resilience, and 
cooperation.  
 
Before proceeding, it is mandatory to point out that the boundaries 
between such sub-themes are not definable with maximum certainty, since 
some of the practices contained in each of them might overlap, or at least 
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possibly fall in more than one of them. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity a 
rather clear-cut division is here presented.  
 
5.1.1. Network security/defence 
 
To avoid malicious actors entering networks, thus data present on them as 
well as systems connected to them, experts speak of strengthening and 
fortifying networks,143 two verbs also present in the assessed primary data. 
The first sub-theme, which has been called network security/defence, is 
linked with tools and software, both reactive and proactive in nature,144 
that are implemented precisely to defend networks as well as data, devices, 
and systems present and connected to them, from malicious intrusions.  
Central to this sub-theme is the capacity for a network and system to 
defend its perimeter, keeping threats outside of it, as well as that of 
preventing further spreading of malevolent software, which managed to 
breach through the initial defences. 
 
The literature often points to the concept of “layered defence”, a term that 
indicates the presence of a multitude of layers each implemented on top of 
                                                 
143 Robert S. Dewar, “The Triptych of Cyber security: a classification for active 
cyber defence”, in 2014 6th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: 
Proceeding, edited by P. Brangetto, M. Maybaum, J. Stinissen (NATO CCD COE 
Publications, 2014), 7 - 22. 
144 The differentiation between reactive and proactive measures taken regarding 
cyber-related issues is a recurring one within the present thesis; for instance, such 
a differentiation is better taken under scrutiny in the chapter dedicated to “active 
cyber defence" measures. 
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the other to slow down attackers and malicious activities.145 Accordingly, in 
simple terms it is possible to speak of perimeter and internal defences. 
Presenting an exhaustive list of all implementable measures and respective 
characteristics is well beyond the scope of the present chapter and not 
really useful to the overall bottom line of the thesis. Nonetheless, some 
general insights on some of the most common techniques are here 
presented, especially to better distinguish this first sub-theme from the 
next ones.  
 
One of the first measures often underlined in the literature are so-called 
firewalls, the digital version of real-life barricades and barriers. Such tools 
are designed to prevent the protected computers from establishing 
potentially malevolent connections and from carrying out certain activities, 
thus acting as filters permitting only those actions deemed valid.146 Such a 
measure is one of the simplest external defences that can be implemented. 
As pointed out by the literature, the practice of filtering, once thought 
impossible, is now widespread, adopted globally at various levels.147 
 
Antivirus are another rather common measure in network security, often 
applied at multiple levels in a network. Such tools function by scanning all 
files present on a system, as well as the incoming traffic, looking for known 
                                                 
145 Jerry Shenk, “Layered Security: Why It Works”, SANS Institute (2013), 5. 
Available at: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/layered-
security-works-34805.  
146 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 62. 
147 Ronald J. Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, “Risking Security: Policies and 
Paradoxes of Cyberspace Security”, International Political Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 1 
(March, 2010), 15 - 32, 24. 
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“signatures”, bits of code that are known for being associated with a specific 
malicious software (“malware”).148 Once detected such malicious software 
can be quarantined and deleted before wreaking damage. 
 
Similarly, so-called "intrusion detection systems” (IDPs) also are tools, or 
better, sensors that monitor network traffic for malicious activity. 149 
Further, their direct successors, called “intrusion prevention systems” 
(IPSs), not only monitor but can also directly and in an automated fashion 
block suspicious network traffic. These latter implement more detection 
methods than antivirus, being able to protect against still unknown threats. 
Indeed, IPSs can detect malicious activity before antivirus signatures are 
created and implemented for them.150 
 
Given that cyber threats update continuously, defenders need to always 
keep pace. For this reason, important measures falling under the umbrella 
of network security/defence involve patch management and antivirus 
updates.151 These consist of updating the list of known malicious software 
and threats, and applying upgrades to the owned systems and networks to 
increase their robustness and fix known weaknesses and potential points of 
entrance for malicious actors.  Such two measures are linked to the human 
layer, therefore to the level of awareness and preparation of a workforce; 
                                                 
148 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 60 - 61. 
149 James Graham, Richard Howard, and Ryan Olson, Cyber Security Essentials 
(Auerbach Publications, 2011), 295. 
150 Mikko Särelä et al., “Evaluating intrusion prevention systems with evasions”, 
International Journal of Communication Systems, Vol. 30, No. 6 (November, 
2017). 
151 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 62 - 63. 
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something that is achieved through sound training. As later shown, the 
human layer is also important within the next sub-theme. 
 
Overall, even if the measures described are implemented, experts agree that 
malicious actors still manage to bypass cyber fortifications. Precisely for 
this reason defenders need to be ready to act even when under attack, 




Resilience is the second sub-theme making up the “story” of the 
“defensiveness” normative thematic category. Such a term has become 
central in many security fields, utilised widely in different contexts and vis-
à-vis various threats. With the advent of the World Wide Web and the 
increasing reliance of societies and firms to the Internet and cyber medium, 
resilience also has started to become a rather central topic in the 
cybersecurity discourse.  
 
Within the cybersecurity field, the literature confirms that such a term 
lacks a universally accepted definition,152 with various authors taking into 
                                                 
152 Myriam Cavelty Dunn, Mareile Kaufmann, and Kristian Søby Kristensen, 
“Resilience and (in)security: Practices, subjects, temporalities”, Security Dialogue, 
Vol. 46, No. 1 (2015), 3 - 14. 
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account different dimensions, characteristics, and practices when 
conceptualising it.153  
 
Nonetheless, a general common understanding defines such a concept as 
the capacity to handle threats when these materialise and regain either the 
initial or a new normal functioning in the least time possible.154 Similarly, 
the 2010 US National Security Strategy defines it as “the ability to adapt to 
changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from 
disruption”.155 
 
By applying such conceptualisations to the cyber domain a simple 
definition of cyber-resilience is reached, namely the ability of systems, 
networks, and related infrastructures to sustain a cyberattack, maintain 
their functioning even when under attack, withstand it, and quickly 
recover from it.156 
 
                                                 
153 Leire Labaka, Josune Hernantes, and Jose M. Sarriegi, “A holistic framework for 
building critical infrastructure resilience”, Technological Forecasting & Social 
Change, Vol. 103 (2016), 21 - 33, 22. 
154 Eviatar Matania, Lior Yoffe, and Michael Mashkautsan, “A Three-Layer 
Framework for a Comprehensive National Cyber-security Strategy”, Georgetown 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall/Winter 2016), 77 - 84, 80.  
155 White House, National Security Strategy 2010 (Washington DC, White House, 
May 2010), 18. 
156 Daniel Dobrygowski, “Cyber resilience: everything you (really) need to know”, 
World Economic Forum, July 8, 2016 (accessed June 2018), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/07/cyber-resilience-what-to-know/. 
 
  74 
It goes without saying then that resilience in cyberspace is something 
different from strict cybersecurity,157 a word that better fits the previously 
mentioned measures,158 since it involves more than software and hardware. 
Resilience indeed is a matter or people and processes, rather than just one 
of architecture and organisation.159 Indeed, for it to be truly reached, there 
needs to be an intentional capacity to work even when conditions are not 
optimal or degraded, coupled with both a technical and behavioural 
predisposition to recover as soon as possible, learning lessons to better face 
future similar events. 160  Overall, experts underline some specific steps 
organisations can take to bolster their cyber-resilience preparedness, which 
involve good policymaking and management, behavioural and cultural 
aspects, as well as more technical ones.161 
 
One initial step involves the awareness regarding the kind of information, 
systems, and infrastructures that need to be protected, from the most to the 
least important. Having a clear picture of the assets that need to be guarded 
and defended, with priorities clearly given, opens the door to better 
                                                 
157 Jake Olcott, “Cybersecurity Vs. Cyber Resilience”, Bit Sight, December 7, 2017 
(accessed June 2018), https://www.bitsighttech.com/blog/cyber-resilience. 
158 Darko Galinec, Darko Možnik, and Boris Guberina, "Cybersecurity and cyber 
defence: national level strategic approach”, Automatika, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2017), 273 
- 286. 
159 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 173. 
160 Ibid., 171. 
161 Cisco, Cyber Resilience: Safeguarding the Digital Organization (2016), available 
at: https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/doing_business/trust-
center/docs/cisco-cyber-resilience-safeguarding-digital-org-wp.pdf; World 
Economic Forum, Advancing Cyber Resilience Principles and Tools for Boards 
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decision-making. Secondly, clear policy guidelines need to be 
implemented, with roles and responsibilities clearly defined, giving equal 
importance to people, processes, and technology. Both these two initial 
steps help speeding up the entire response process. Thirdly, given that most 
experts still consider the human factor the “soft underbelly” of 
cybersecurity, sound training and awareness raising programs are 
fundamental measures to be implemented to enhance cyber-resilience,162 
since they not only raise awareness on the overall network infrastructure 
present within an organisation, but also teach the workforce best cyber 
hygiene practices, such as to regularly back up their files.163 
 
Finally, from a more technical point of view, one simple step to enhance 
cyber-resilience is to make networks redundant, duplicating their 
components to increase reliability.164 Further, organisations can implement 
new and more resilient systems, which are characterised by faster and 
simpler recovery procedures to a previous or new state of integrity. 165 
Finally, running red-team exercises, penetration tests to discover potential 
vulnerabilities, also enhances cyber-resilience.166 
                                                 
162 Nick Wilding, “Cyber resilience: How important is your reputation? How 
effective are your people?”, Business Information Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2016), 94 
- 99. 
163 Olcott, “Cybersecurity Vs. Cyber Resilience”. 
164 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 171. 
165 Igor Linkov et al., “Resilience metrics for cyber systems”, Environ Syst Decis, 
Vol. 33 (2013), 471 - 476, 473. 
166 Warwick Ashford, “UK leading in using red team cyber security testing”, 








The third and final sub-theme of the “defensiveness” “thematic normative 
category” is centred around cooperation practices. These can happen both 
at the national and international level, with the primary aim of bolstering 
overall awareness and knowledge of cyber threats and risks, thus 
preparedness and capabilities to repeal, manage, and recover from attacks 
and malicious intrusions. Indeed, such sub-theme, as already hinted, finds a 
close linkage with the two already explained sub-themes, cyber 
security/defence and cyber-resilience.  
 
At the domestic level, cooperation takes place (and is needed further) 
between private firms, government, federal departments, and agencies. 
However, much more emphasis is posed on cooperative efforts between the 
public and private sector. The so-called concept of Private-Public 
Partnerships (PPPs) has been around since the second half of the 20th 
century, being presented as a silver bullet to various problems in many 
fields, but also receiving some criticism across time. 167  Explaining the 
“lights and shadows” of PPPs is beyond the scope of the present 
dissertation, nonetheless important is that in recent years such a concept 
conquered a central position within the cybersecurity discourse, with many 
official national strategies underlying the importance of achieving sound 
                                                 
167 Myriam Cavelty Dunn and Manuel Suter, “Public-Private Partnerships are No 
Silver Bullet: An Expanded Governance Model for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection”, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Vol. 4, No. 
2 (2009), 179 - 187, 180. 
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cooperation, especially in regards to critical infrastructures protection 
(CIP).168 
 
At the international level, cooperation in the field of cybersecurity and 
cyber defence has become a major topic of discussion as well, especially 
between countries pertaining to an international organisation or alliance. 
For instance, the importance of achieving sound cooperation between 
states has been discussed and pushed forward both at the European Union 
and NATO level.169 
In simple terms, the main point of cooperating and creating partnerships is 
primarily that of sharing actionable knowledge and awareness, such as 
information collected from suffered cyber attacks; or in jargon “threat 
intelligence”. Such information is the “good” that experts point out needs to 
be shared in order to enhance overall cybersecurity. 170  Moreover, also 
                                                 
168 Madeline Carr, “Public–private partnerships in national cyber-security 
strategies”, International Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 1 (2016), 43 - 62. 
169 ENISA, Cybersecurity cooperation: Defending the digital frontline (October 
2013), available at: 
https://www.google.cz/search?q=cooperation+is+key+cybersecurity&oq=cooperati
on+is+key+cybersecurity&aqs=chrome..69i57.4646j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF
-8#; Warwick Ashford, “Cooperation and exercises key to cyber defence, says Nato 
centre”, Computer Weekly, March 9, 2018 (accessed June 2018), 
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252436575/Cooperation-and-exercises-
key-to-cyber-defence-says-Nato-centre. Here, a key topic is that of norm 
promotion and norm emergence, something not directly taken into account in the 
present dissertation, as already pointed out. 
170 Itzik Kotler, “The Key To Cybersecurity: Shared Intelligence And Industry 
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experience and best practices on how to defend and recover from an attack 
are key “goods” that need to be shared.  
 
Finally, cooperation has been utilised as diplomatic tool to increase bilateral 
and multilateral relationships among countries that might see each other as 
adversaries under certain lenses. In other words, sharing information can 
be utilised as a confidence building mechanism, a vehicle through which 




If the “defensiveness” thematic normative category connotes a “story” of 
measures taken to bolster one cybersecurity without necessarily harming 
an adversary, the second thematic normative category crafted in the 
present dissertation, “offensiveness”, narrates precisely the opposite. 
 
On a general level, the term “offence” connotes an image of an action 
undertaken to hurt something or someone else. Indeed, such term’s 
etymology comes from the Latin word “offendere”, which can be translated 
with the expression/verb “to strike against”.171  
The meaning of such a term is in reality broader than what mentioned, 
encompassing also actions that might not be violent per-se.172 Despite that, 
in the present dissertation of interest is the highlighted meaning and 
                                                 
171 Merriam-Webster, “Offense”, Merriam-Webster, (accessed June 2018), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offense.  
172 For instance, prosecuting acts from a strictly legal point of view, both at the 
domestic and international level. 
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etymology, which serves as a guiding framework for the creation of this 
“offensiveness" “story”. 
One that shares a bridge with the logic of zero-sum, since it is explained by 
the threat or use of force, and practices that by increasing the security of 
one actor decrease that of others, creating the so-called “(cyber) security 
dilemma”. Overall, the “story” of this second thematic normative category 
encompasses a discourse and strategic thinking that favour offensive cyber 
capabilities over defensive ones, thus an offensive use of the medium itself, 
as well as that signal a willingness to go aggressive towards adversaries on a 
broader and general level. Arguably, the “story” of “offensiveness” appears 
also closely tied to the notion of “cyber war”.173  
Whether for “defensiveness” three key sub-themes have been highlighted, 
all linked to both technical and non-technical cybersecurity measures and 
practices, for the one presented in the following paragraphs such a clear 
distinction between measures and practices might not be possible to be 
drawn. Indeed, despite some sub-themes being presented, the ways to 
achieve their intended results all adopt more or less the exact same tools, 
namely weapons that are designed to be exploited aggressively against 
menaces/threats and adversaries, which can either be kinetic or cyber in 
nature. For the sake of clarity, “cyber weapons” needs to be defined. As 
pointed out by Stevens, a universally accepted definition of such kind of 
                                                 
173 The notion of "cyber war” is a rather debated one. Within the present 
dissertation the one offered by Clarke and Knake is deemed sufficient: “actions by 
nation-states to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the 
purposes of causing damage or disruption”. Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. 
Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About 
It (Ecco; Reprint edition, August 5, 2011), 6. 
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weapons still is lacking, with the term having been utilised as a catch-all 
phrase indicating a rather large set of malware said to be capable of various 
effects.174 In the present dissertation cyber weapons are conceptualised as 
“tool[s] (computer code) that [are] used, or designed to be used, with the 
aim of threatening or causing physical, functional, or mental harm to 
structures, systems, or living beings”. 175  Also, especially to better 
understand the analysis of “active cyber defence” measures, it must be 
pointed out that in cyberspace the concept of border/boundary is not as 
straightforward definable as it is for more traditional domains, being 
debated and subject to dispute. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity, the 
present dissertation overlooks such issue concentrating rather on the 
already defined definitional distinction between techniques that relate to 




The notions of preemption and prevention form the first sub-theme 
forming the “story” of “offensiveness”, two terms often grouped under the 
umbrella of “anticipatory action/attack”.177  Despite being linguistically very 
close one to the other, such two terms have rather different connotations, 
                                                 
174 Tim Stevens, “Cyberweapons: An Emerging Global Governance Architecture”, 
Palgrave Communications, Vol. 3 (January 2017). 
175 Thomas Rid & Peter McBurney, “Cyber-Weapons”, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 157, 
No. 1 (2012), 6 - 13, 7. 
176 Paul Rosenzweig, “International Law and Private Actor Active Cyber Defensive 
Measures”, Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter, 2014), 
103 - 118, 106. 
177 Karl P. Mueller et al., Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. 
National Security Policy (RAND, 2006), xii. 
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depicting two distinct strategic behaviours. Indeed, from a strategic 
thinking point of view, if on one hand to preempt means using military 
force firstly “when an enemy attack already is underway or, at the least, is 
very credibly imminent”; 178  on the other, as Brodie puts it, prevention 
entails “a premeditated attack by one country against another, which is 
unprovoked in the sense that it does not wait upon a specific aggression or 
other overt action by the target state”.179 In other words, to prevent entails 
attacking first not due to an imminent attack, but to avoid a possible future 
re-balancing of the status quo, which might puts an adversary in a more 
favourable position.180 Regarding the US, the discourse on such two terms, 
hence strategic thinking, can be traced back to the initial stages of the Cold 
War. Whether a differentiation between the two of them existed during 
the 20th century, with the turn of the millennium, the 9/11 attacks, and 
the Bush Presidency, the boundaries between the two terms became 
blurred, with the term preemption being utilised to connote also its 
counterpart. 181  Indeed, the 2002 National Security Strategy defines 
preemption in rather broad and general terms as “striking first against 
perceived security threats under a variety of circumstances”.182 
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The second sub-theme is that of retaliation. From a strategic point of view 
such a term means acting after having suffered an initial attack, launching a 
counter-attack. Within the US, such a term has been mostly linked to the 
logic of deterrence, being a key tile within the logic of “mutual assured 
destruction” (MAD). Such a possible strategic behaviour has been also 
transposed to the cyber medium, precisely to the concept of cyber-
deterrence, a rather debated one, which sees experts and academics split in 
two.183 Despite some scepticism being raised in regards of the feasibility of 
sound retaliation in cyberspace due to malicious actors’ possibility to hide 




The third and last sub-theme is that of domination, which from a strategic 
point of view entails a willingness to dominate a specific domain of 
warfare, maintaining the upper hand and denying it to perceived 
                                                 
183 On the possibility to achieve deterrence in cyberspace much has been written. 
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adversaries; precisely something that entails a disparity in capabilities, thus 
in security as well. Of course to dominate also means being able to resist an 
attack, however much more emphasis is given to the development of 
aggressive means capable to give one actor an advantage over another. This 
sub-theme shares some similarities/overlaps with that of 
preemption/prevention, since to some extent it also entails the possibility to 
carry out some operations first, nonetheless it is explained as something 
different. Further, it also finds a link with the notion of cyber-power, since 
this latter is here understood as "the ability to control and apply typical 
forms of control and domination of cyberspace”.185 
 
Easier said than done, cyberspace is a much more complex domain than the 
most common ones, land, air, and maritime. Being entirely man made it 
presents some characteristics and peculiarities, 186  which undermine the 
possibility to achieve a high degree of persistent domination. Libicki 
divides the medium into three specific layers: 1) a physical one, entailing 
hardware that participate in making cyberspace exist; 2) a syntactic one, 
which consists in all those software-operational instructions and rules that 
are provided to the physical layer; and finally, 3) a semantic one, grouping 
the vast amounts of data and information that flow across the ether of 
cyberspace, hence through its physical nodes.187  Each of these layers is 
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dominated by exploiting different aggressive measures. Further, one needs 
to act on all of them, since “conquering” one does not necessarily mean 
dominating the others.188  
 
Leaving such vast debate aside, in following Sun Tzu’s thought, many 
scholars point out that in cyberspace to truly achieve the upper hand and 
dominate it is mandatory to have a complete knowledge of the adversary’s 
offensive and defensive capabilities. Achieving so requires the gathering of 
intelligence, which within the cyber medium is done through so-called 
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) operations. Since according to the 
literature the practice of intelligence gathering is the norm in interstate 
relationships,189 with the cyber medium only having opened the door to a 
larger amount of information to be potentially gathered, and the US having 
a long lasting legacy and interest in such a practice,190 domination from that 
point of view is not taken into account. Rather, what is understood as the 
sub-theme of domination is a form of “operational preparation of the cyber 
battlefield” (OPB). A practice that entails an aggressive breaching of 
adversaries’ networks and systems and the placement of so-called logic 
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bombs and trapdoors, 191  which give a rather high degree of strategic 
advantage, hence domination. Indeed, whether trapdoors can be 
understood as secret openings left behind by attackers in adversaries’ 
networks to be later exploited to quickly regain access to them;192 logic 
bombs are “piece[s] of code inserted into a software system that can lie 
dormant and undetected for extended periods of time […] activated to 
perform some malicious function [at a later moment]”.193 
 
Domination in cyberspace is often understood as the possibility to conduct 
operations in a safe way, “without prohibited interference by an 
adversary”, 194  or more precisely as the “degree of dominance one force 
holds over an adversary that permits freedom of action in cyberspace at a 
given time and place while denying the same to that adversary”. 195 
Something that according to the view adopted in the present dissertation 
can indeed be achieved through the aggressive measures mentioned, since 
they provide a strategic head start, hence diminishing the possibility to be 
interfered when carrying out cyber operations. In fact, some experts draw a 
parallel between air and cyber superiority. In this latter, commanders 
                                                 
191 Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, 31. 
192 Stephen Northcutt, "Security Laboratory: Methods of Attack Series”, SANS, 
May 2, 2007 (accessed June 2018), https://www.sans.edu/cyber-research/security-
laboratory/article/log-bmb-trp-door.  
193 Christopher J. Eberle, “Just War and Cyberwar, Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 
12, No. 1 (2013), 54 - 67, 62. 
194 Lt Col William D. Bryant (USAF), “Cyberspace Superiority: A Conceptual 
Model”, Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 6, No. 6 (November–December, 2013), 
25 - 44, 39. 
195 Han Bouwmeester, Hans Folmer & Paul Ducheine, “Cyber Security and Policy 
Responses”, in Cyber Warfare: Critical Perspectives, edited by Paul Ducheine, 
Frans Osinga, and Joseph Soeters (t.m.c. Asser press, 2012), 19 - 48, 28. 
 
  86 
before green lighting a strike needs to be sure that the defensive systems 
deployed by the enemy have been suppressed, in order to lower the 
possible resistance to the raid by the enemy. In a similar fashion, when a 
cyber operation is planned against an adversary’s system or network, 
commanders may want to firstly “attack the enemy’s computer systems to 
[nullify its] ability to penetrate and disrupt [the] information and 
communication networks [utilised in conducting the attack]”.196 Precisely 
for this reason, according to DOD's Joint Concept on Cyberspace (JCC), 
domination in cyberspace can be achieved also through Offensive Cyber 
Operations (OCOs).197 
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6. A “cyber strategic culture” dominated by “defensiveness” 
 
The present chapter seeks to demonstrate that across the analysed data 
corpus the three-sub themes that participate in creating the “story” of the 
“defensiveness” “thematic normative category” constantly appear, 
occupying a rather central spot within the general cyber-related narrative. 
Precisely their consistency across time is understood as a proof that the US 
cyber strategic culture is predominately and continuously informed by a 
norm of “defensiveness”. A result rather in line with what already stated by 
some scholars within the literature.198 The analysis of the discourse of the 
data corpus points out that all three “defensiveness” sub-themes are present 
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in nearly all official documents. Indeed, there is consistency between the 
documents published by the White House and military as well. 
 
6.1. White House  
 
One of the richest documents in terms of information and discursive 
evidence is the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. Among the 
various measures to implement, focus is especially given to the creation of a 
“multi-layered defence” and resilient networks.  
Several references are furthermore made to patch management, 
vulnerabilities reduction, damage and recovery times minimisation, and 
deployment of systems less vulnerable;199 all of which can be interpreted 
precisely as falling within the first two sub-themes of “defensiveness”. 
Furthermore, the 2003 official document also highlights the need to share 
information both at an interagency level, with the private sector, and 
internationally with allies.200  
 
The second most important document published by the White House 
regarding cybersecurity is the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace. 
The discourse found in it also puts the accent on the need to strengthening 
network defences and the capability to withstand and recover from cyber 
attacks, isolate and mitigate disruption, and share information and early 
warning capabilities. Therefore presenting all three “defensiveness” sub-
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themes. Such document states the following: “[t]he United States will 
continue to strengthen our network defenses and our ability to withstand 
and recover from disruptions and other attacks. For those more 
sophisticated attacks that do create damage, we will act on well-developed 
response plans to isolate and mitigate disruption to our machines, limiting 
effects on our networks, and potential cascade effects beyond them”.201 
 
The various points highlighted in 2003 and 2011 can be found in various 
National Security Strategies (NSS) as well.202 For example, the 2010 NSS, 
despite remaining rather vague, highlights the importance to achieve 
resilient networks, design (and implement) more secure technology, defend 
networks from intrusion and disruption, as well as build and sponsor 
awareness, and especially domestic and international cooperation.203 The 
NSS published in 2015, focusing much on critical infrastructure protection, 
adopts the verb “fortifying” also within the context of cybersecurity; a term 
connected to network security/defence, stating that the US is "fortifying 
[its] critical infrastructure against all hazards, especially cyber espionage 
and attack”.204 In addition, such official documents also shares an overall 
discourse linked to resilience and cooperation as well, stating that actions 
are being undertaken by “working with the private sector, civil society, and 
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other stakeholders to strengthen the security and resilience of U.S. critical 
infrastructure”.205 
In the latest 2017 NSS, again several sentences and words utilised point to 
resilience, network security/defence, and cooperation.206 Resilience truly 
stands out for importance, indeed on a more general level an entire sub-
section is dedicated to it, with the document stating that building a culture 
of resiliency across multiple US systems, from economic to political ones, is 
a "key goal”. 207  Such an importance is then mirrored also regarding 
cyberspace, with resilience being stressed within the context of 
government, private networks, and national critical infrastructures. For 
instance, the 2017 NSS states the willingness to achieve “uninterrupted and 
secure communications and services under all conditions”.208 Interestingly, 
the 2017 NSS clearly underlines the importance of prioritising the 
infrastructures, systems, and data to be secured, which, as explained in the 
previous chapter, is a key step to increase the overall degree of resilience. 
In the official document words: “[t]o improve the security and resiliency of 
our critical infrastructure, we will assess risk across six key areas […]. We 
will assess where cyberattacks could have catastrophic or cascading 
consequences and prioritise our protective efforts, capabilities, and defenses 
accordingly”.209 Furthermore, the 2017 NSS underlines the need for a new 
forward-looking ethic to secure and enhance resiliency of the country’s 
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critical infrastructures, namely the fact that such a condition needs to be 
implemented right from the start, rather than simply added afterwards 
since malicious actors can exploit such a temporary gap within the 
infrastructure.210 Regarding network security/defence, the 2017 NSS clearly 
speaks of “layered defences”, which must be deployed in order to avoid the 
spread of malicious activity, which “must be defeated within a network and 
not be passed on to its destination whenever possible”.211 Finally, regarding 
the third sub-theme, in line with the previous White House documents, 
also the latest NSS stresses the importance of cooperating, both 
domestically with the private sector and internationally with allies to 




With the exception of the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS), most 
documents published by the military display a discourse also filled by such 
a narrative, which persisted throughout time. 
The originally secretive 2006 NMS for Cyberspace Operations clearly 
underlines the importance of achieving “redundancy, restorative capacities, 
consequence management”, 213  a “layered defense-in-depth approach”, 214 
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“partnerships to increase resilience”, 215  “sensors to detect malicious 
activity”,216 and “self-healing capabilities”,217 among others; all discursive 
references that do fall underneath the three sub-themes of “defensiveness”, 
networks security/defence, resilience, and cooperation.  
The 2011 DOD’s Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, also contains key 
passages that highlight a discourse centred mostly on “defensiveness”. 
Initially such document explains that CYBERCOM has been established to 
answer specific DOD needs, such as building resiliency and smart 
partnerships. 218  In addition, the document speaks of the importance of 
cyber hygiene best practices, and the adoption of adaptive and dynamic 
network defences, as well as interagency and international collaboration.219 
For example, the strategy states a continuous usage of “advanced sensors to 
detect, discover, map, and mitigate malicious activity on DOD networks”,220 
and that “[b]y sharing timely indicators about cyber events, threat 
signatures of malicious code, and information about emerging actors and 
threats, allies and international partners can increase collective cyber 
defense”.221 This document is truly important for the analysis conducted 
within the present dissertation, since it highlights how the DOD 
underwent a “shift” in its approach to cybersecurity, embodied in the 
adoption of “cyber active defence” (ACD) measures. In fact, as it is better 
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shown in a following chapter, such a paradigm not only entails 
“defensiveness”, but also entails some specific measures and tools, which do 
fall underneath the umbrella of “offensiveness”. Given the complexity and 
centrality of ACD, the author decided not to split the discussion on it, 
presenting it within one unified chapter. Despite this latter being placed 
within the discussion of “offensiveness”, here only a brief mention on the 
fact that ACD is a vehicle for “defensiveness” serves the purpose, with the 
actual analysis carried out in a dedicated sub-section of the next chapter. 
The NMS of the same year also is full of discursive proofs of 
“defensiveness”, making references to practices and measures falling within 
all three sub-themes of such first “normative thematic category”, such as 
“multi-layered defense”,222 resiliency,223 and cooperation.224 
 
Whether the 2015 NMS only shares some mild references to the need to 
protect networks and infrastructures,225  the 2015 DOD's Cyber Strategy 
more or less reprises what stated in 2011. There is a clear discourse centred 
around the sub-theme of network defence/security, with the strategy 
stressing that “DoD conducts network defense operations on an ongoing 
basis to securely operate the Department of Defense Information Network 
(D[O]DIN), [responding quickly when] indications of hostile activity 
within [DOD’s] networks [are detected] [closing and mitigating] 
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vulnerabilities and secur[ing] […] networks and systems”.226 The sub-theme 
of resilience is reprised and paralleled to the need of building redundant 
networks to achieve continuation of operation even when under attack or 
in degraded conditions. 227  Further, to increase readiness and discover 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses the practice of red-teaming is said to be 
conducted.228 Finally, the sub-theme of cooperation is also present, with the 
official strategy pointing out the willingness of DOD to cooperate with 
allies from various regions of the world.229  
 
In conclusion, as already mentioned, despite not fully reported here, there 
are other primary sources that highlight the preponderance of 
“defensiveness” sub-themes within US cyber strategy culture. For instance, 
more empirical discursive proofs of it can be gathered by assessing the 
following official documents: PPD - 21, Department of Homeland Security 
Quadrennial Reviews and Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future, as well as 
President Barack Obama 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review. As already 
explained, such documents have been left out of the analysis because their 
implementation would not have dramatically altered the obtained results. 
Nonetheless, they have been mentioned in order to enhance the overall 
transparency of the thesis. 
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7. “Offensiveness” - an increase of it within the US “cyber strategic culture” 
 
In the timeframe under scrutiny in the present dissertation, key discursive 
passages found within the documents, coupled with the implementation of 
the already mentioned “active cyber defence” (ACD) measures, participate 
in showing how the US “cyber strategic culture” in recent years seems to be 
increasingly informed by “offensiveness”. This chapter, which can be 
considered as the fulcrum of the present dissertation, seeks to highlight 
precisely that. Before proceeding onwards with the analyses of ACD, the 
2015 DOD’s Cyber Strategy, and the latest 2017 NSS, forming the real 
centre of the present thesis’ argument, some other key documents that do 
display “offensiveness”-related sub-themes are briefly analysed. 
 
7.1. “Offensiveness” before ACD, DOD’s 2015 Cyber Strategy, and 2017 
NSS 
 
7.1.1. White House 
 
Interestingly, before the 2017 NSS, only two other documents published by 
the White House do display some mild hints of aggressiveness. 
For instance, the 2011 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace underlines that 
“[w]hen warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in 
cyberspace as [it] would to any other threat to [the] country[, reserving] 
the right to use all necessary means – diplomatic, informational, military, 
and economic – as appropriate and consistent with applicable international 
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law, in order to defend [the] Nation, [its] allies, [its] partners, and [its] 
interests”.230 Further, the 2015 NSS points to the willingness of the US to 
“impose costs [vis-à-vis a cyber aggression] on cyber malicious actors”.231 
Such a discourse arguably highlights the presence of the sub-theme of 
retaliation. Using words such as “respond” and “impose costs” within the 
context of military power does connote the possibility to adopt force 
against a menace coming from cyberspace. 232  Such documents remain 
rather vague, with the discourse not really giving much more details on 
how such a response would play out. It is stated that the US will act in 
accordance with international law, indeed as pointed out by experts and 
scholars, political and military circles within the US do share the opinion 
that the rules governing armed conflict do find an application also in 
cyberspace. Going into details into such a topic is well beyond the scope of 
the present dissertation, nonetheless what is important to understand is the 
fact that, precisely through pushing forward a rhetoric that sees the 
adoption of such rules also vis-à-vis cyber operations, the US is trying to 
make it legal to adopt aggressive force in retaliation also against cyber 
attacks reaching a certain threshold, which remains of difficult 
definition. 233  More in detail, the US is pushing forward the notion of 
“equivalence”, which states how against “a cyber attack [that] produces the 
death, damage, destruction or high-level disruption [equal to those] a 
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traditional military attack would cause, then it would be a candidate for a 




Regarding the documents published by the military, the 2004 NMS states 
that “[t]he Joint Force requires the ability to conduct information 
operations, including electronic warfare, computer network operations 
[and that] [i]nformation operations, both offensive and defensive, are key 
to ensuring US freedom of action across the battlespace”.235 Despite this 
passage not really fitting with any of the presented “offensiveness” sub-
themes, it does display a strategic thinking tuned toward an aggressive 
usage of the cyber medium. In 2006, the NMS for Cyberspace Operations 
further pushed the discourse towards an ever more aggressive tone.236 The 
sub-theme of domination can be found, as well as a signalling regarding the 
willingness to conduct offensive cyber operations. Four passages stand out: 
1) “[T]he United States must have cyberspace superiority to ensure our 
freedom of action and deny the same to our adversaries through the 
integration of network defense, exploitation, and attack;237 2) “[o]ffensive 
capabilities in cyberspace offer the United States and our adversaries an 
opportunity to gain and maintain the initiative. DOD cyberspace operations 
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are strongest when offensive and defensive capabilities are mutually 
supporting”;238 3) “[DOD] will execute the full range of military operations 
[…] in and through cyberspace to defeat, dissuade, and deter threats against 
US interests”;239 and 4) “cyberspace [should be used] to accelerate [the] 
decision-making cycle while degrading that of the adversary [as well as] 
exploiting adversary cyberspace vulnerabilities”.240 
Similarly to the 2004 one, despite not really having any discursive practices 
falling under a specific sub-theme, the 2011 NMS signals a readiness to act 
implementing the necessary resources to oppose “any nation’s actions that 
jeopardize access to and use of […] cyberspace”.241 
A rhetoric further re-prised and taken up a scale, in line with the DOD’s 
Cyber Strategy of the same year, as later shown, within the NMS published 
in 2015. Such a document indeed speaks of a willingness to “project power 
across all domains”,242 therefore also the cyber one, to defeat adversaries.243 
 
7.2. Active Cyber Defence - a paradigm connoting an offensive strategic 
posture 
 
This sub-chapter aims at further better clarifying why from a discursive 
thematic point of view the DOD’s 2011 Strategy for Operating in 
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Cyberspace finds a place under both the “defensiveness” and 
“offensiveness” thematic categories. If, as seen such strategy contains 
mainly sub-themes/codes linked to “defensiveness”, the reason why 
arguably also a degree of “offensiveness” is present lies in “active cyber 
defence” (ACD) measures. Indeed, such a term first appeared precisely in 
the 2011 DOD’s strategy, discussed under the second of the five strategic 
initiatives highlighted in the document, the one titled “DoD will employ 
new defense operating concepts to protect DoD networks and systems”.244 
According to the strategy, the DOD has been implanting new defensive 
paradigms in order to face the challenges deriving from an ever-increasing 
malicious cyber activity.245  Despite not sharing too many technical and 
operational details on it, ACD are highlighted as being the new kind of 
defences to serve such purpose, defined as following: “DoD’s synchronised 
real-time capabilities to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats[,] 
[operating] at network speed using sensors, software and intelligence to 
detect and stop malicious activity ideally before it can affect DoD networks 
and systems”.246 
Leaving aside the broad discussions on both the legality and positive and 
negative consequences of ACD, the present chapter aims at unpacking such 
defensive paradigm and demonstrate how under certain aspects it is 
possible to assert how its implementation can be interpreted as a subtle 
manifestation of aggressiveness, hence proof of the fact that the US cyber 
strategic culture is being informed by a norm of offensiveness. The present 
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chapter is divided in three parts. Initially, a brief overview of ACD is 
presented in order to build the ground for further exploration.  Secondly, 
the briefly previously introduced defensive conceptualisation of ACD is 
outlined. Thirdly, a more in depth analysis is undertaken, displaying how 
ACD also bears a more aggressive face. 
 
7.2.1. A general overview 
 
ACD since its first appearance on the DOD’s 2011 Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace maintained an aura of ambiguity around itself, remaining “one 
of the most debated concepts in cybersecurity”.247 Scholars from various 
fields of study have been writing extensively on it. Indeed, a universally 
accepted conceptualisation seems to be lacking, not only among academics 
and experts, but also among international actors. For instance, whether 
debates are on-going in academia, such a situation has been observed also 
in international fora, such as NATO. 248 
 
In general terms, the debates on ACD have as central point of contention 
the broadness to be attributed to such defensive paradigm. As the 
remainder of the present chapter highlights, on one side there are those 
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who contend that ACD measures are to be understood as only those 
proactive steps taken within the victim’s network; while on the other, 
there are those who argue that ACD is a much broader paradigm, 
encompassing also more aggressive measures, which go beyond the victim’s 
network “boundaries”. Nonetheless, point of contact among the debaters is 
the fact that ACD equals to proactiveness rather than simple reactiveness; 
or in other words, to measures that not simply wait passively, but that 
directly engage with the malicious actor/activity before and during the 
attack in more or less aggressive ways.249 
 
7.2.2. Defensive ACD 
 
Regarding the fist position, both Lee and Buchanan understand ACD as a 
set of measures to be applied within one owns networks in order to bolster 
overall defensive and resiliency capabilities. Lee parallels ACD to 
intelligence gathering and usage, crafting what he coins the “Active Cyber 
Defense Cycle”. According to his view, ACD is to be understood as “the 
process of analysts monitoring for, responding  to, learning from, and 
applying their knowledge to threats internal to the network”.250 Mirroring 
such an interpretation, Buchanan speaks of “hunting” as the proactive “look 
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within the network for weaknesses and for malicious code that may have 
exploited […] weaknesses”.251  
 
Many techniques are highlighted as falling under the umbrella of the term 
“hunting”, such as: 1) network security monitoring, a term that dates back 
to the early 2000s, which indicates “the collection, analysis and escalation 
of indications and warning to detect and respond to insertions”; 252  2) 
conducting memory forensics, “finding and extracting forensics artefacts 
from a computer’s physical memory” in seeking the presence of malicious 
code;253 and, 3) setting up some penetration testing to assess the strength of 
the defences.254 Other specific measures fitting this conceptualisation of 
ACD are so-called “white worms”, also known as “defense-ware”.255 On one 
hand, such benign software are programmed to identify and destroy 
malicious malware in an automated way,256 and on the other to identify 
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intrusion and carry out recovery procedures as well. 257  So-called 
“honeypots” also serve some of the above-mentioned purposes. Identified as 
a form of decoy, as their name suggest “honeypots” are information system 
resources that are designed to duplicate a valuable and potential target as 
closely as possible in order to lure and deceive attackers, being then able to 
collect precious data about the malicious activity and procedures, exposing 
also vulnerable services.258 Indeed, their value rests in “the unauthorised or 
illicit use of that resource”.259 Finally, some experts enrich this particular 
notion of ACD stressing the fact that they serve the purpose of confounding 
and slowing down an attacker already within the system, rather than trying 
to block access in the first place.260  One technique that long has been 
studied, tested, and applied is so-called “address hopping”. Drawing insights 
from radio frequency communications, this technique grants the possibility 
to a computer’s network to change identity in a dynamic way during the 
transmission of data. 261  In other words, “address hopping” can be 
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understood as a form of obfuscation, which primary role is that of 
confusing the attacker.262 
 
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III stressed the 
importance of building the capacity to “hunt" and attack directly on US 
network “to get the intruders who do get past the initial defenses”.263 From 
his words, it is possible to appreciate the fact that all the above-mentioned 
techniques, which are proactive but defensive (remaining within the 
victim’s network boundaries), do fall under the DOD’s definition of ACD 
measures. So under this light, it is possible to argue that, at least on the 
surface, DOD's conceptualisation of ACD is yes proactive but informed by a 
norm of “defensiveness”, since the mentioned techniques all somewhat fall 
within the first, and arguably also second, sub-theme of such “thematic 
normative category”. 
 
7.2.3. Offensive ACD  
 
As briefly introduced, within the literature there are also those who 
conceptualise ACD in a way diametrically opposite from that adopted by 
Lee and Buchanan. Many scholars indeed broaden the concept of ACD 
inserting within it also more aggressive cyber operations. For instance, Carr 
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defines ACD as also containing “electronic countermeasures designed to 
strike attacking computer systems and shut down cyber attacks 
midstream”. 264  Accordingly, often it has been pointed out how ACD 
generally falls in either one of the following: “detection and forensics, 
deception, and attack termination”.265  
 
A recent study conducted by the World Economic Forum has stated that 
ACD as a term “captures a spectrum of proactive cybersecurity measures 
that fall between traditional passive defenses and offense”.266 Similarly, the 
George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security 
published some graphics that by clarifying some of the techniques found 
along the mentioned spectrum highlights how vast the concept of ACD is, 
de-facto spanning from passive defence to cyber offense.267 
 
Dewar, drawing from the DOD's definition and this aggressive version of 
ACD, offers a middle-ground definition of it, which builds a bridge 
between the two above mentioned. In his view, ACD is to be understood as 
a two-fold security paradigm employing “the real-time identification and 
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mitigation of threats [within] defenders’ networks [and] the capacity to 
take aggressive, external, offensive countermeasures”. 268  More in detail, 
ACD is “an approach to achieving cyber security predicated upon the 
deployment of measures to detect, analyse, identify and mitigate threats to 
and from communications systems and networks in real-time, combined 
with the capability and resources to take proactive or offensive action 
against threats and threat entities including action in those entities’ home 
networks”.269 
 
Such more aggressive techniques said to fall within ACD are all some sorts 
of retaliatory countermeasures, which have been commonly labelled by 
experts as “hack back”, a name that clearly connotes offensiveness, since it 
entails accessing the source of the attack, going beyond the victim’s 
network “boundaries”. Indeed, measures falling under the umbrella of 
“hack back” range from invasive techniques to various counterstrike 
methods all deployed to access the attacking source to either disable 
(disrupt), destroy, or seize control of it, using for example armed 
payloads.270 Some examples are “botnet takedowns, white hat ransomware, 
[and] efforts to recover stolen data by [indeed] hacking back”.271 
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Further, an aggressive understanding of ACD does not encompass just 
“hacking back” in the sense of going beyond one own’s boundaries to 
aggressively target an adversary network or system to harm it, as in 
shutting it down or disrupting it. According to some, offensive/external 
ACD also means gathering of data and intelligence; precious information 
on other states’ cyber capabilities and intrusion plans, which are then 
exploited to strengthen cyber defences.272 Despite this view being shared by 
many within the literature, as already mentioned, this aggressive 
understanding of ACD as intelligence gathering is not taken into account. 
 
At first glance, the definition of ACD given by the DOD does not lend itself 
easily to a more aggressive reading, however already by taking into 
consideration the technical debate on such defensive paradigm, which 
point out also their potential offensive conceptualisation, coupled with the 
mentioned “militarization" historical context characterised by other proofs 
of aggressive use of the cyber medium by the US, arguably their adoption 
signals a norm of “offensiveness”.  
 
In order to dive deeper into how ACD is conceptualised within the US 
governmental circles another primary document must be brought under 
scrutiny, namely the already mentioned Presidential Policy Directive No. 
20 (PPD-20). Whether on the surface it does seem that ACD encompasses 
proactive measures falling under the umbrella of “hunting”, which engage 
with the adversary within the victim’s network “boundaries”, a textual 
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analysis of PPD-20 arguably reveals that at the federal level ACD is 
conceptualised as also being characterised by aggressive proactive measures, 
which share an extra-territoriality connotation;273  thus, in line with its 
“expanded” conceptualisation. 
 
The originally secretive PPD-20 published under the Obama 
administration, precisely in 2012, is a document containing directives about 
the conduct of cyber operations by federal government agencies, as well as 
by the military, which updates principles and processes of the US national 
cybersecurity policy. 274  Since its disclosure by the Edward Snowden’s 
leaks, 275  PPD-20 has been deemed truly important by experts and 
commentators since not only it sheds more light on the way the US thinks 
regarding its cyber power, but especially because it outlines many 
definitions, such as that of "cyber effect", “network defence”, “defensive 
cyber effects operations” (DCEOs), and "offensive cyber effects operations” 
(OCEOs), which help clarifying the nature of ACD. 
 
Regarding “cyber effect”, a rather straightforward definition is given, being 
understood as “the manipulation, disruption, denial, degradation, or 
destruction of computers, information or communication systems, 
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networks, physical or virtual infrastructures controlled by computers or 
information systems, or information resident thereon”.276 
 
"Network defence” is understood as actions and the use of software “on a 
computer, network [...] by the owner or with [its] consent [...] for the 
primary purpose of protecting that computer, network, or system; data 
stored on, processed on, or transiting that computer, network, or system; or 
physical and virtual infrastructure controlled by that computer, network, 
or system”.277 A definition that seems to be close to the already mentioned 
conception of ACD, or at least that underlines actions taken within the 
boundaries of a network. 
 
Of most importance to understand the broader nature of ACD, is the term 
“defensive cyber effect operations” (DCEOs), which defines all such 
activities, "other than network defence and cyber collection[,] that are 
intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside US Government 
networks for the purpose of defending or protecting against imminent 
threats or on going attacks or malicious cyber activity against US national 
interests from inside of outside cyberspace”.278 
 
According to Flowers and Zeadally, the fact that DCEOs share the purpose 
of defending and protecting US national interests, coupled with their 
semantically constructed differentiation from both network defence and 
                                                 
276 Obama, Presidential Policy Directive No. 20, 2. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid., 3. 
 
  110 
cyber collection activities, means that DCEOs “can encompass a broad 
range of proactive activities [in line with their stated purpose] that can be 
used for pre-emptive or first-strike initiatives”.279  
 
Moreover, so-called “non-intrusive defensive countermeasures” (NCDMs), 
which are identified by PPD-20 as a subset of DCEOs and defined as 
including activities not requiring direct access to terminals and information 
on them without the consent of the owner, and creating only “the 
minimum cyber effects needed to mitigate the threat activity”,280 underline 
the presence of another non-identified category of DCEOs whose activity is 
far more severe than that of NCDMs. 
 
Therefore, ACD can arguably be understood as such other subset of 
DCEOs. 281  In addition, more proof for such an interpretation can be 
gathered from the section “anticipatory action”.282 Within such portion of 
the directive, the reference to “anticipatory actions taken against imminent 
threats”,283 as included in DCEOs, further hints towards the point Flowers 
and Zeadally make.284 Accordingly, the two academics offer a definition of 
ACD based on their analysis of PPD-20 as including “operations and related 
programs or activities conducted by or on behalf of the US Government, 
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that manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy computers, information 
or communication systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructures 
controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident 
thereon for the purpose of defending or protecting US national interests 
against immediate threats or on going attacks or malicious cyber activity 
occurring inside or outside cyberspace”.285 
 
Overall, given the language adopted within PPD-20 and the reference 
made to pre-emptive and first-strike options, it can be argued that such 
actions are closer to offense rather than simple defence, “rendering ACD a 
pseudonym for offensive cyber actions,286 and those practices falling under 
the umbrella of “hack back”. It does then seem that the US understands 
ACD in line with the mentioned definition offered by Dewar.  
 
With this background in mind, arguably the signalling of the Pentagon of 
its implementation of ACD underlies a double rhetoric, both defensive and 
offensive. ACD, if intended in line with Dewar do seem to be a 
(ambiguous) vehicle showing how “offensiveness” is informing the US 
“cyber strategic culture”, embodying two of its sub-themes, namely 
retaliation and preemption/prevention. 
 
Finally, more insights do come the notion of Defensive Cyberspace 
Operations (DCOs). Through such kind of operations, which can be 
conducted in response to attacks of various intents, either exploitations or 
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actual damage, the military is called to defend the nation, or at least the 
assets assigned to it.287 DCOs implement both passive and active cyberspace 
defence activities implemented to outmanoeuvre adversaries and “change 
the current paradigm where the attacker enjoys significant advantage”;288 
DCOs can take place both within the owned networks’ boundaries, as well 
as beyond them, taking respectively the form of Internal Defensive 
Measures (IDMs) and Response Actions (RAs).289 Whether IDMs involve 
those measures and techniques that fall within the “hunting” paradigm, 
RAs involve more aggressive actions and countermeasures implemented 
directly against the “shooter”.290 Such a conceptualisation seems to be in 
line with the broader/extended conceptualisation of ACD presented in this 
chapter. Overall, arguably this is yet another proof that within the US ACD 
is conceptualised and implemented also in an aggressive way, being 
therefore a vehicle of the “offensiveness” norm informing the “cyber 
strategic culture”. 
 
7.3. The 2015 DOD’s Cyber Strategy - “offensiveness” more openly 
manifested 
 
In this chapter attention is posed on the Cyber Strategy published by the 
DOD during in April of 2015. Such official document offers yet other 
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glimpses into how the US military thinks of its cyber power. Such 33-page 
official document is an important discursive moment that demonstrates 
how the US “cyber strategic culture” is being informed by a norm of 
“offensiveness”. Despite also elements connoting “defensiveness” are 
present, as previously pointed out, much emphasis is given to offensive 
cyber capabilities and their strategic use.291 The present chapter aims at 
further unpacking the discourse found in the 2015 DOD Cyber Strategy. To 
do so some key passages of the text are presented and further explanation of 
the message they carry given. 
 
During a speech at Stanford University in 2015, then US Secretary of 
Defense Ashton B. Carter set out the three missions CYBERCOM has in the 
cyber domain. According to his words, CYBERCOM mainly maintains a 
defensive role, 292  defending its own networks and weapons as well as 
helping defending the US from foreign cyberattacks; however, among such 
two mission, CYBERCOM also has that of providing offensive cyber 
options capable of enhancing the US military in a broader sense.293 
 
                                                 
291 Danni Vinik, “America’s secret arsenal”, Politico, September 12, 2015 (accessed 
June 2018), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/12/defense-department-
cyber-offense-strategy-000331. 
292 See the chapter on the Literature Review. 
293 Ashton Carter, “Remarks by Secretary Carter at the Drell Lecture, Cemex 
Auditorium, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California”, U.S. 
Department of Defense, April 23, 2015 (accessed June 2018), 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-
View/Article/607043/remarks-by-secretary-carter-at-the-drell-lecture-cemex-
auditorium-stanford-grad/.   
 
  114 
Already from Mr Carter’s words it is possible to grasp the fact that more 
openness has started to characterising the discourse around the possible use 
of cyber offensive capabilities. Further, his speech clearly signals the fact 
that, despite wishing to defend and deter cyber attacks, the US military is 
ready to act in an aggressive manner when deemed necessary.294 
 
Despite leaving some key questions still unanswered, for the first time the 
2015 DOD Cyber Strategy not only openly acknowledges that cyber 
offensive capabilities have been, and are being developed, but also clearly 
states that the US has the capability to strike adversaries’ information 
systems, being ready to unleash its cyber arsenal under some 
circumstances.295  
 
The document states the following: “[t]here may be times when the 
President or the Secretary of Defense may determine that it would be 
appropriate for the U.S. military to conduct cyber operations to disrupt an 
adversary’s military-related networks or infrastructure so that the U.S. 
military can protect U.S. interests in an area of operations”.296 And also the 
following: “[i]f directed, DOD should be able to use cyber operations to 
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disrupt an adversary’s command and control networks, military-related 
critical infrastructure, and weapons capabilities”.297  
 
The document thus arguably signals that the US thinks of its cyber arsenal 
also in offensive terms, as a proper “general-purpose war-fighting tool”.298 
Precisely this rhetoric is what clearly distinguishes the 2015 document 
from its preceding ones, also more openly showing the norm of 
“offensiveness” being currently informing the US “cyber strategic culture”. 
 
For instance, a willingness to further integrate cyber operations into 
broader kinetic operational practices is clearly signalled within the 
document, 299  in showing how the cyber component of war will keep 
gaining momentum within the US "cyber strategic culture”, thus arguably 
speeding up a process started already before the turn of the millennium, as 
pointed out in the chapter on the literature review. 
 
Regarding preemption/prevention, the 2015 DOD document is rather clear 
on acting in an anticipatory self-defence way, stating that a possibility to 
act in a preemptive fashion exists also in cyberspace: “If directed by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. military may conduct cyber 
operations to counter an imminent or on-going attack against the U.S. 
homeland or U.S. interests in cyberspace. The purpose of such a defensive 
measure is to blunt an attack and prevent the destruction of property or the 
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loss of life”.300 Overall, speaking of offensive capabilities utilised under a 
defensive rubric is something usually captured under the paradigm of 
active defence, 301  thus arguably ACD. This passage shows that there is 
continuity within the DOD thinking, especially regarding the possibility to 
activate some offensive cyber capabilities to preempt an adversary 
operation. Thus, that the norm informing it did not really change in the 
time gap between the two cyber strategies, therefore between 2011 and 
2015. 
 
Linked to the possibility to act preventively is the bridge built by the 
strategy between cyber weapons and conflict escalation. The DOD utilises a 
discourse centred on its duty to provide the US President with several 
options to manage conflict escalation, one of them being its cyber 
capabilities. The fact that the strategy refers to periods of “heightened 
tensions”,302 which arguably precede a situation of open conflict, suggests 
how offensive cyber actions might be undertaken before the outbreak of 
hostilities, hence utilised early in a potential first strike.303 This particular 
passage arguably also finds a link with ACD, or at least with those who 
have argued for a conceptualisation of it as also encompassing the usage of 
cyber weapons firstly for political reasons, as in the case of Stuxnet.304 
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Finally, linked to all what said there is yet another discursive passage that 
demonstrates the presence of the sub-theme of domination and the practice 
of “operational preparation of the cyber battlefield” (OPB), therefore that 
the norm of “offensiveness” is informing the culture. Conducting active 
cyber reconnaissance and probing is rather ambiguous and not aggressive 
per se. In cyberspace, it is difficult to understand the purpose behind an 
operation since many of those tools utilised to simply surveil an adversary 
can be used to carry out more aggressive operations as well, ranging from 
intelligence collection to trapdoors and logic bombs placing. Nonetheless, 
with the discourse contained in the latest DOD strategy pointing out that 
cyber operations will be increasingly incorporated in the overall military 
power, that the DOD needs to provide the US President with a broad range 
of options in the moments possibly leading to an open conflict, and that 
preventive cyber strikes have been clearly signalled as a possible norm 
rather than exception, it is possible to argue that the US will likely carry on 
with continuity the practice of cyber OPB.305 Regarding such practice, a 
recent article appeared on Nbc news underlined how (allegedly) the US 
already had violated some Russian critical infrastructure systems, achieving 
the possibility to take action against them. According to sources cited by 
the news article, the US military rigged Russian systems with trapdoors and 
logic bombs that could be activated in case of serious attacks, causing major 
disruption. A measure that the article parallels to that of “active defence”,306 
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and that somewhat confirms a more openly aggressive strategic posture 
adopted by the US towards its adversaries.307 
 
7.4. The latest National Security Strategy - yet another step towards 
“offensiveness” 
 
The National Security Strategy published at the end of 2017 has already 
been introduced. In the chapter explaining the predominance of the 
“defensiveness” thematic normative category the presence of the three sub-
themes making up such theme’s “story" have been showed. Here, the goal is 
to point out how the 2017 NSS also bears proof of the presence of the 
“thematic normative category” of “offensiveness”. This official document 
contains some passages and expressions, which do point out a rather 
aggressive rhetoric, finding also a link with the discourse present within 
the 2015 DOD's Cyber Strategy and the analysed concept of ACD. The 
present brief chapter proceeds as following, firstly the general purpose of 
the discourse found in the 2017 NSS is presented; secondly, attention is 
posed to cybersecurity, with some key expressions and words being 
presented and analysed in building a bridge with the general purpose 
previously described, as well as with other empirical data coming from 
statements made by political and military officials. 
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From a general point of view, the latest NSS displays a rather aggressive 
rhetoric centred on a willingness to disrupt, defeat, and prevent activities 
that could endanger the US. In one key passage, the NSS states the 
importance and the need to “disrupt [and] defeat potential threats before 
they reach the United States”.308 The usage of “potential” as a pre-modifier 
well connotes the image of acting preemptively against menaces that still 
need to materialise, hence a predisposition or readiness to engage first, 
adopting a proactive aggressive defensive stance, rather than a simple 
reactive one. Such tone is the one to have in mind when also reading the 
passages devoted to cybersecurity, which to some extent directly mirror it. 
 
For instance, the latest NSS states that the US “will go after […] digital 
networks […] of terrorists and criminals [who] evade detection”,309 “use 
sophisticated investigative tools to disrupt [illicit activities],310 “impose […] 
costly consequences”,311 and “defeat [and go after] malicious actors”,312 be 
them terrorists, criminals, or state-actors. For example, recently the US has 
clearly stated to having conducted “cyber-campaigns” against assets 
pertaining to the infamous terrorist organisation known as Islamic State 
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(IS). 313 
 
Further, in one of the most important passages for the analysis carried out 
in the present paper, the NSS states that in doing so the US will be “risk 
informed but not risk averse in considering [its] options”.314 An expression 
that seems not in line with the overall tone found in previous White House 
documents, which is characterised by a higher degree of prudence. For 
example, the 2011 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace states that the US 
“will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of 
inaction”.315 
 
According to some commentators, precisely the expressions, “go after”, 
“impose costs”, disrupt”, “defeat” all are signs of the aggressiveness lying at 
the bottom of US cybersecurity discourse. Indeed, they participate in 
showing how the US “cyber strategic culture” is increasingly being 
informed by “offensiveness”. Such a discourse connotes a more proactive 
and forward leaning strategic posture,316 thus in line with what signalled in 
the 2015 DOD’s Cyber Strategy, finding also a link with the analysed ACD 
(and DCO as well). Finally, the bold statement that the US will not be “risk 
averse”, when evaluating its possible actions, entails the possibility to 
utilize the cyber arsenal, despite from a self-defence position, to conduct 
                                                 
313 Jeppe Teglskov Jacobsen and Jens Ringsmose, “Cyber-bombing ISIS: why 
disclose what is better kept secret?”, Global Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2017), 125 - 137. 
314 Ibid., 32. 
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Security, and Openness in a Networked World, 14. 
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first strike or retaliatory cyber operations. Therefore, also in the latest NSS 
the sub-themes of retaliation and preemption/prevention are present.  
 
The overall tone found in the 2017 NSS seems to be in line with remarks 
made by President Trump during his presidential political campaign. In 
2016, Mr Trump spoke of the need for the US to achieve the capacity to 
launch “crippling cyber counterattacks”, and retain dominance in the cyber 
medium.317  It must be noted that, already before Mr Trump’s remarks, 
other top US officials invoked the need for more offensive cyber 
capabilities. Admiral Michael S. Rogers, former head of CYBERCOM and 
NSA, underlined the need to boost the military’s overall cyber offensive 
capabilities to better deter threats and malicious actors. A position endorsed 
by both senators McCain and King and long advocated by former (and first) 
head of CYBERCOM General Keith Alexander.318 Overall, it does indeed 
seem that the strategic thinking shared by such personalities is being 
reflected in official documents, which in turn demonstrate how the US 
“cyber strategic culture”, despite displaying “defensiveness”, is also being 
increasingly informed by “offensiveness”. 
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In the 1970s, Russell Frank Weigley clearly separated between military and 
national strategy. A division based on the differing ways through which 
goals are meant to be achieved. Whether militaries strive to achieve their 
goals by threat or use of force, civil governmental bodies focus on 
developing “political, economic, and psychological powers”.319 Despite such 
a dichotomy being fully present within the US cyber strategic culture, since 
it is indeed the military the body that has been demonstrating a tendency 
to prefer a display of force rather than the White House, with the 2017 NSS 
such a differentiation is starting to be eroded. If it is true that the process of 
militarisation present since the early 2000s has seen the military taking an 
increased role in defending the US in cyberspace, with an increasing 
recognition of such a role by civil governmental bodies, arguably within 
official documents prior to 2017 no such similarities in tone and rhetoric 
between the White House and Pentagon can be found. Something that 
further demonstrates how the overall US “cyber strategic culture” is 
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8. Concluding remarks 
 
8.1. Discussion and summary of findings 
 
The present dissertation has sought to analyse the US approach to 
cybersecurity from a national strategic point of view, seeking to understand 
whether it displays more a defensive of aggressive posture, and whether it 
is possible to speak of a “shift”, or at least track an evolution of it. The 
historical timeframe taken under scrutiny has been the one the world is 
currently undergoing, said to have begun in the early 2000s and labelled by 
experts as “militarization”. 
 
Overall, the literature already has provided some proofs of a “shift” towards 
an aggressive use of the cyber medium by the US during the 1990s and 
especially since the early 2000s. Precisely this rich literature has formed the 
starting point of the present dissertation, which however has intended to 
further expand the already formed knowledge, analysing and approaching 
more recent primary and secondary sources from a rather different 
theoretical perspective than those found within the literature on the topic. 
Indeed, the author has approached the US strategic behaviour from an 
ideational and interpretative point of view, focusing on the norms that 
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Drawing insights from both the meta-theoretical tradition of 
Constructivism and from the research agenda of strategic culture studies, 
the present thesis has adopted a methodology centred on discourse, as well 
as on the analysis of themes, informed precisely by the mentioned 
theoretical approaches. Overall, two opposite “thematic normative 
categories” have been built, following an initial a-priori approach, deriving 
insights from the literature, then refined with the content found within the 
gathered and assessed primary sources. Their names reflect the kind of 
strategic behaviour and norms the author was interested in, respectively 
“defensiveness” and “offensiveness”. In brief, “defensiveness” entails a 
research for security regarding threats and risks arising from cyberspace 
that not necessarily decreases that of other actors; while “offensiveness” is 
linked to a logic of zero-sum and notion of cyber war, entailing a more 
aggressive strategic behaviour centred around a potential use of force. The 
three sub-themes making up their respective “stories” reflect such 
conceptualisation, being for “defensiveness”, network security/defence, 
cyber-resilience, and cooperation; while for “offensiveness”: 
preemption/prevention, retaliation, and domination. 
 
The methodology mentioned above has been applied to a set of official 
documents and texts, published by the White House and military, with 
attention being mostly directed towards the defensive paradigm of “active 
cyber defence” (ACD) measures, the 2015 Department of Defense’s (DOD) 
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Rather in line with what highlighted in the literature, the present thesis 
has uncovered that the norm of “defensiveness” has been predominantly 
and steadily informing the US “cyber strategic culture” during the 
scrutinised historical period. Indeed, all three sub-themes making up the 
“story” of “defensiveness” constantly re-appear throughout the assessed 
primary sources. 
Regarding the other norm, that of “offensiveness”, of most interest for the 
dissertation itself, a more complicate picture has been delineated. Indeed, 
whether some hints of it can be found within documents published before 
2011, it is from that moment onward when arguably such a norm has been 
mainly informing/mirroring the US “cyber strategic culture”. 
Already in documents published in 2004 and 2006, the military has been 
displaying a rather aggressive rhetoric regarding the use of the cyber 
medium, something nonetheless in line with the information provided by 
the surveyed secondary literature, and already proofs of presence of the 
norm of “offensiveness” highlighted by the literature. Such a rhetoric can 
also somewhat be found in documents from 2011 and 2015 from both the 
White House and military; primary sources (different from those 
thoroughly taken as key empirical ones) that however already do fall 
within the time period when a sort of evolution regarding the norm of 
“offensiveness” can be appreciated, as the present thesis argues.  
The author has further uncovered the workings of such social structure 
especially in the concept of ACD, firstly introduced in 2011. Such a 
paradigm from a technical point of view also encompasses measures that 
are linked to the “thematic normative category” of “defensiveness”, with 
the official discourse surrounding it also hinting towards such norm; 
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nevertheless, by diving deeper in the ACD conceptualisation debate, the 
author has highlighted that a much broader understanding of it exists 
within the literature and among cybersecurity experts. ACD does indeed 
also encompass other type of measures and strategic behaviours that can be 
said to be closely linked and fall within the “offensiveness” theme. Further, 
the official document Presidential Policy Directive No. 20 (PPD-20), 
published in 2012 under the Obama administration, offers a more intimate 
look into how the US establishment conceptualises ACD, arguably as a 
paradigm encompassing also aggressive measures to be potentially projected 
towards adversaries. Overall, coupling the broader version of ACD, with its 
arguable understanding within the US shows how such defensive paradigm 
is a subtle vehicle showing that the US “cyber strategic culture” is informed 
by the norm of “offensiveness”, displaying its sub-themes of retaliation and 
preemption/prevention.  
Further, the 2015 DOD’s Cyber Strategy, despite having some elements of 
“defensiveness” too, appears to openly acknowledge a more aggressive 
rhetoric. Within it, the discourse well points out two of the sub-themes 
making up the “story” of “offensiveness”, namely preemption/prevention 
and domination, displaying also a link to ACD as well.  
Finally, the latest NSS, contains the “offensiveness” sub-themes of 
retaliation and preemption/prevention, being characterised by a much 
bolder and aggressive rhetoric than precedent White House official 
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In conclusion, the present work somewhat has confirmed the thesis 
advanced by Saltzman on the fact that the US cyber strategic posture is of a 
“paradoxical defensive nature”. The literature already has pointed out that 
the US, despite having demonstrated an actual aggressive use of the cyber 
medium, also behaved in restraint. The present analysis, has further 
uncovered how despite the discourse present in official strategies has been 
predominantly showing “defensiveness”, since 2011 it is possible to speak of 
a “shift”, or better, of an evolution with the discourse, despite being centred 
around a logic of self-defence, showing an increased presence of 
“offensiveness”. 
 
As a last remainder: what stated here must not be interpreted as 
encompassing causality, since such a claim was not one of the present 
research goals. Indeed, having uncovered the fact that the US “cyber 
strategic culture” seems to be increasingly informed by “offensiveness” does 
not necessarily entail that an aggressive strategic behaviour will be actually 
carried out. Indeed, the present thesis understands discourse and norms as 
social structures shaping a “realm of possibilities”. Similarly, also the 
assessed official strategic documents signal potential behaviour, with states 
still left open to a different type of conduct.  
 
8.2. Potential future research  
 
Regarding the overall analysis of culture, the present thesis is just one 
initial step towards a much greater understanding of what here has been 
called the US “cyber strategic culture”. More “intimate” empirical data is 
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needed to further study such a concept, which might become available in 
the near future, coupled with direct contacts with those directly involved 
in the decision-making process. Moreover, interesting would be to analyse 
whether the US strategic approach to cybersecurity reflects some much 
more consolidated and old cultural aspects such country has demonstrated 
also in other domains, conflict situations, technologies, and moments in 
history.  
Overall, only mentioned in the present thesis, arguably the uncovered 
“offensiveness” finds a link with the logic of deterrence, which is the one 
that seems to predominate within the US establishment. Analysing 
whether there truly is a link between such an evolution and the logic of 
deterrence can well become the central topic of further research. Similarly, 
understanding all the driving forces and (geo)political and material factors 
behind such an increased preponderance of the norm of “offensiveness” 
through the adoption of various theoretical lenses also requires more 
research, posing focus to its interests and perceived constraint behaviour. 
Finally, given the highly debated nature of ACD, much more research is 
needed on its conceptualisation and role within “cyber-inter-state” 
relationships. Indeed, whether some scholars argue in favour of the ethics 
of ACD, 320  others have pointed out some negative consequences its 
applicability might bring, especially regarding the international order, and 
Westphalian conception of sovereignty. 321  Because the analysis brought 
forward in the present thesis regards only the understanding and 
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conceptualisation of ACD within the US, a broader research can result 
interesting, maybe comparing different states’ conceptualisation and 
strategic approaches to it. 
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